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On March 7, 1936, German troops reoccupied the
Rhineland, an area which had been demilitarized by the
Treaty of Versailles.

The reoccuoation was carefully

planned and .carried out by the German Chancellor, Adolph
Hitler, against the advice of his General Staff.

Hitler

had evaluated the international situation and timed his
Rhineland move precisely.

The reactions of Great Bri-

tain and France to his rearmament program, the reintroduction of conscription, aDd Germany's departure from
the League of Nations had convinced Hitler that his revisionist goals could be accomplished with a minimum of
opposition from the western democracies.

The Anglo-

German Naval Agreement indicated tacit British aooroval

of Germany's rearmament, in spite of the Versailles

armaments limitations.

The Abyssinian crisis had seri-

ously weakened Anglo-French solidarity, and Hitler took
advantage of the disunity of the opposition to further
his own designs.

This caper deals with the weaken ing of the European structure which had been created by t h e Versail l es
treaty and reaffirmed by the Locarn o pac t of 1 925.

Hit -

ler publicly denounced the "chains of Versai l les " and
used the remilitarization of the Rhineland to break
those chains .

Onl y a firm reaction by Grea t Britain

and France could have saved the structure.

Why they

failed to respond to this cha ll enge is the theme of t hi s
paper .

France, even thoug h her own front i er was in -

volved, was so paralyzed by domestic unrest , po l itica l
paltering , diplomatic impotence and military i n effectiveness that she could not respond.

England preferred

to negotiate and appease rather than adoot a resolute
stance, and France followed the British lead.

Both

countries had been forewarned, but neither was ~repared
when the crisis came.
The remilitarization of the Rhineland was the /
fir s t major indication of Hitler ' s revision ist olans,
and had he been met with resolution and force by the
western democracies , perhaps the tra ~edy of Munich
and possibly even of Poland and Wor l d War II could
have been averted.

Hitler' s earl y s uccesses confirmed

him i n his belief that th e western democracies could

be bluffed and blackmailed into capitulation and led
him to make increasingly harsh demands at the expense
of Eastern Europe.

The precedent for appeasement was

set in 1936 when Great Britain agreed to German sovereignty in the Rhineland, abandoned the Eastern European nations and thereby sealed the fate of Czechoslovakia.
Using The Times (London), the New York Times.and
several news journals, I was. able to reconstruct some
of the events bf 1935 and early .1936.

The memoirs of

Anthony Eden, Paul Reynau~ arid Albert Sneer provided
some insight into the varying national points of view
regarding the Rhineland occupation and German aggression.

An inval~able source was found in a Ph.D. dis-

sertation by Aaron Goldman, "Crisis in the Rhineland,"
which provi:des

a blow-by-blow

account of the events

surrounding the crisis.
Once I had obtained the facts and delineated the
events, I sought further interpretation as to the impact of remilitarization upon Europe.

Although I used

a variety of sources, the most helpful was General
(U.S. Army, retired) Telford Taylor's monumental study,
Munich, the Price of Peace.

I believe the remilitarization of the Rhineland
clearly illustrates two historical lessons:

that

alliances a.re totally ineffective unless they are
backed by a willingness to act and that appeasement
of aggression can only lead to further capitulation.
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INTRODUCTION
On Saturday, March 7, 1936, Adolph Hitler sent
German troops into the demilitarized zone of the
Rhineland.

By resuming the watch on the Rhine, he

repudiated the Treaty of Versailles and the Pact of
Locarno, exposed the weaknesses of the European alliance system and undermined the fragile peace of
Europe.

His actions precipitated the worst crisis

'

'

Great Britain and Fran:ce had·. faced · since World War
I, and in effect, challenged them to another war.
Why this challenge went unanswered is the theme of
this '[)aper.
The uncertainty and hesitation displayed by
France in the face of the Rhineland crisis reflected
the true state of the French nation.

On the surface,

France was a vigorous and strong democracy, safe behind an invincible fortified line, and defended by a
p·owerful military force.

An intricate system of al-

liances made France the partner of the largest nation
in Europe and the protector of a group of lesser European powers.

Yet beneath the surface lay the reality

of French political life.

In France the fear of Com-

munism was just as pervasive as the fear of Fascism,
and in many ways, more damaging.

1

Domestic distrust

2

of the Russians made the Franco-Soviet Pact unpopular
in France and caused a decisive split in public opinion.
This wasteful and sometimes violent cleavage between
the right and left sapped the nation of its vitality
and left it open to disorder.

Largely because of in-

ternalprob,lems, the French government was stymied in its
efforts to formulate a cohesive foreign policy, and continually demonstrated its inability to maintain a position of leadership in international affairs.
The remilitarizatfon of the Rhineland revealed
similar circumstances in Great Britain and exposed the
paradox inherent in British policy regarding Western
Europe.

For the sake of her own security, Britain

could not allow an invasipn·of either France or Belgium.

But for the sake of peace, Great Britain, sup-

ported by public -opinion, could no longer guarantee
the demilitarized zone of the Rhineland.

Hhet;her by

intuition, blind luck or diplomatic acumen, Hitler
was able to capitalize on these weaknesses and further his own designs.
Many historians have argued that the Munich conference of 1938 was the critical episode or turning
point of the inter-war years.

They maintain that the

po1icy of appeasell)ent: followed by Great Britain and

3

France at that critical juncture resulted in World
War II.

The purpose of this paper is to show that

the pivotal point was earlier,in March of 1936, and
that if Hitler was to have been stopped, the attempt
should have been made then.
The remilitarization of the Rhineland and the British and French reaction to it clearly illustrate the
appeasement, wishful thinking and self-delusion of
the inter-war years.

These attitudes contributed to

a decline of the chances for peace in Europe and sim'
ultaneously created a situation
which made war more

likely.

The Rhineland crisis occurred early enough

in Hitler's career that a firm reaction to his aggression might have placed an obs.tacle in his path, and
by impeding.his initial success, perhaps have led to
an entirely different kind of Europe than that which
existed from 1939-19~5.
The failure of the Western powers to oppose Hitler's remilitarization of the Rhineland confirmed him
in his belief that France and Britain could be bluffed
and blackmailed into further acquiescence by the threat
of war, provided that the threat remained no empty gesture.

Britain 1 and France each looked to the other for

reinforcement of weakness rather than confirmation of

4
strong resolve, and what they would not do from a
position of strength in 1936, they would subsequently
attempt to do from a position of weakness at Munich
in 1938.

CHAPTER I
VERSAILLES, LOCARNO AND THE DEMILITARIZED ZONE
Although the Allies were victorious in World War
I, they had suffered heavily, and perhaps no country
had suffered more than France.

In addition to the dev-

astation of her territor~ she had lost 1,393,388 men,
a figure which represented 3.5:per.cent of her total
population,and 39 percent of .all Allied war deaths. 1
The victory, aithough purcha~ed at great cost,
did not mean security for.the French nation.

What

would happen when the German phoenix arose from the
ashes?

The French representatives at the peace con-

ference in 1919 were determined to gain French security at whatever cost to Germany.

Their demands in-

cluded German disarmament, the return of AlsaceLorraine and the complete separation from Germany of
her provinces west of the Rhine. 2
1

James Thomas Emmerson, The Rhineland Crisis 7
March 1936: A Stud in Multilateral Diplomac . (Ames:
Iowa State University Press, 977 , p. 9 ..
2
Arnold Wolfers, Britain and France Between Two
Wars (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1940), pp. 11-23.
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Although they secured the first two demands, the
third clashed with Woodrow Wilson's principles of national sovereignty and offended the British sense of
pragmatism.

A compromise among the powers resulted in

the demilitarized zone of the Rhineland.

It was agreed

at Versailles that German military forces would never
again be allowed west of a line drawn fifty kilometers
(thirty miles) east of, and parallel to, the Rhine.
(See Appendix A for a map of the zone)

In addition,

fortifications were permanently prohibited within the
zone.

Any violation of these articles, 42 and 43 of

the Treaty of V_ersailles, would be regarded, said
Article 44, as a "hostile act·.

. calculated to

..

disturb the peace of the worid."

(The relevant clauses

of the Treaty of Versailles are given in Appendix B)
The treaty "did not, however, oblige any country to aid
France in preventing German remilitarization of the
Rhineland. 3
Having failed to gain the Rhineland either as a
protectorate or as a buffer state, France sought assurance from her allies that they would come to her aid in
the event of unprovoked German aggression.
3

Emmerson, Rhineland Crisis, p. 20.

In addition,
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she sought some sort of guarantee of the demilitarized
zone.

An Anglo-American security guarantee was signed

on 28 June 1919, which promised aid to France, but fell
short of guaranteeing the demilitarized zone.

The

agreement stipulated that British aid was contingent
upon approval by the United States.

The subsequent

failure of the American Senate to ratify the Treaty
of Versailles doomed the Anglo-American security guarantee and in effect, left -Fran~e.to her own devices.
France regarded this as a betrayal by her allies.

She

then concluded a series of alliances with the lesser
European nations who considered themselves threatened
by the possibility, of a resurrected Germany.

In Sep-

tember 1920, a military arrangement .was concluded between France and Belgium.

In February 1921, a defen-

sive alliance was made.with Poland, and others were
signed with Czechoslovakia. in January 1924; Hungary
in June 1926, and with Yugoslavia and Rumania in November 1927.

This alliance system, known as the "Lit-

tle Entente," was based on the idea
security."

of "collective

The premise that the union of European

states would act as a deterrent to German aggression,
merely by the fact of its existence, characterized

8

French diplomatic efforts during the inter-~ar years.
In 1933 France signed a non-aggression pact with Russia which would lead in 1936 to a treaty of mutual
assistance.4
This obsession with security intensified French
determination to enforce strict adherence to the provisions of the Treaty of Versailles, an attitude clearly illustrated during the Ruhr crisis.

French troops,

assisted by a small contingent'. of Belgian Regulars,
occupied ·the· Ruhr Valley, a major German industrial
area, in January 1923, because Germany was behind in
the delivery·of timber and coal.

These deliveries

were part of a _scheme of r_ej:Jarations payments which
the German government -had declared itself incapable
of making.

France sought the assistance of Great

Britain, but when this was

?ot forthcoming she deci-

ded to occupy the area, take over the mines and factories, and force the reparations payments.

The French

occupation of the 'Ruhr furthered in Germany the already
simmering desire for revenge against Franc~.

The epi-

sode increased the already rampant hostility toward
the Treaty of Versailles, and in addition, created in
Germany a feeling of isolation from the rest of Europe.5
4 rbid., pp. 20, 21.
5
wolfers, Britain and France, p. 56.

9

By 1924, however, a general change in European
attitudes had begun.

Hostilities diminished, pros-

perity began to return, and the European nations began to move toward multilateral agreements that would
guarantee peace in Western Europe.

Whether this change

came about because of general weariness of hostility or
because of the easing of the reparations problem, the
result was the Treaty of Locarno.

The treaty was ne-

gotiated by Gustav Stresemann, Austen Chamberlain,
Aristide Briand, ·and belatedly, Benito Mussolini.

The

Locarno pact included non-aggression agreements between
Belgium, France and Germany.

Italy and Great Britain

both pledged to come to the aid of any country which
was the victim of unprovoked aggression by another
treaty partner.

In addition, at Stresemann's sugges-

tion, the German government_voluntarily reaffirmed its
obligations under Articles 42 and 43 of the Treaty of
Versailles.

Britain and Italy promised to guarantee

the continued existence of the demilitarized zone, militarily if necessary.

However, innnediate military ac-

tion was promised only if Germany massed troops inside
the zone as an obvious forerunner to invasion.6

6

.
Ennnerson, Rhineland Crisis, pp. 22, 23
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The Treaty of Locarno was in essence a pledge to
respect Europe·an national fron.tiers.

Each of the five

nations involved, Great Britain, Italy, France, Belgium, and Germany, was constrained from committing aggression against another treaty signatory.

Great Bri-

tain and Italy promised to come to the aid of any country
which was the victim of unprovoked aggression from any of
the five nations.

Means for actual enforcement of treaty

obligations were vagu~ .'

.The .Council of the League of Na-

tions, on which Great.Britai~ had a permanent seat, was
given the responsibility· of deciding.whether or not an
obligation to intervene had.· arisen.
two exceptions.

,Ther!= were, however,

Great Britai~ and Italy, as guarantors,

pledged themselves to immediate action in the case of a
"flagrant" violation of any partner's territory, provided that the_guarantors themselves recognized the violation as flagrant.

In addition, immediate action was

warranted in the event of a flagrant breach by Germany
of the Rhineland clauses of the Treaty of Versailles,
provided that the guarantors had satisfied themselves
that this aggression was unprovoked.

7

(The relevant

clauses and articles of the Treaty of Locarno are given in Appendix C)
7
A. L. Kennedy, Britain Faces Germany (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1937), p. 46.
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Although Great Britain agreed at Locarno to
guarantee the western borders of Germany, she refused to extend such a pledge to the eastern nations of Czechoslovakia and Poland.

The British

government regarded Eastern Europe as outside the
bounda~ies of her own national interests.

These

nations continued to depend upon France for their
security and territorial integrity, since Germany
would not renounce her claims to frontier changes
.
h e east. 8
int

The Locarno Pact was vague and its machinery cumbersome.
function.

In fact, it was never intended to actually
It·s very existence was s.een as adequate

to preserve peace in'Western 'Europe.

The "spirit of

Locarno" was hailed as a great step toward peace, yet
it did not erase- the distrust felt in France toward
Germany.

Locarno did not eliminate the French obses-

sion with security, and from 1925 on, the French nation, relying increasingly on defensive fortifications became more and more introspective and French
9
public opinion became increasingly pacific.
8Aaron L. Goldman, "Crisis in the Rhineland: Britain, France and the Rhineland Crisis of 1936" (Ph.D.
dissertation, Indiana University, 1967, University Microfilms, Ann Arbor, Michigan), p. 6.
9
Emmerson, Rhineland Crisis, pp. 24, 25.
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It was obvious to the French at this time that
although guarantees had been made regarding European
peace in general, those made with regard to the Rhineland were not very binding, and in fact no other Locarno signatory, including Belgium, whose borders
were contiguous with the Rhineland, considered the
continuation of the demilitarized zone critical to
peace in Eu:rope.
To both the Sarraut and Blum

governments, the

Rhineland· was essential to French security and to the
security of French allies.

The Rhineland is the key

German industrial .area and includes the cities of
;

Cologne, Coblenz, Krefeld, Aachen and Mainz, all in
an area of about 9500 square miles. 10 As long as
Germany was kept from remilitarizing and fortifying
the area, the French Army was in an excellent position
against the industrial heartland
. for a quick blow
.
of Germany.

Prior to rearmament, it would have been

easy for the French ·to send their armies into the
Rhineland, as they had done during the Ruhr occupation of 1923.

If this threat to Germany's industrial

lONew York Times, March 18, 1936.
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life did not succeed in keeping the Germans from following a policy of force in Eastern Europe, the resulting war would at least be fought on German soil.
German fortification of the Rhineland would considerably impair France's effectiveness in aiding her
allies in Central and Eastern Europe in the event of
German aggression.

Therefore, the remilitarization

of the Rhineland was not only a threat to France's
own security, it was_an even_gr~ater menace to the
security of ;French ?llies in C_entral and Eastern
Europe.

To the French, remilitarization would mean

the beginning of the end for'their postwar policy of
balancing German power by a system of collective security.11
Conversely, the Rhineland was of great importance
to Germany, and became even_n;iore so when Adolph Hitler
rose to power.

When Hitler became Chancellor of Ger-

many in January 1933, he brought with him an intense
hatred for what he called the "chains of Versailles,"
and was determined to pursue a revisionist policy
which would alter existing international agreements
11 charles A. Micaud, The French Right and Nazi
Germany 1933-1939: A Study of Public Opinion (New
York: Octagon Books, Inc,, 1964), pp. 77,78.
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and accommodate Germany's new status in the world.

Be-

cause of its industrial capacity, the Rhineland was inextricably linked with rearmament, and the rearmament
of Germany was of primary importance to Hitler.

As long

as the zone remained vulnerable to French invasion, it
was not possible for Germany to take full advantage of
the Rhineland's capabilities and resources.

With the

removal of the threat of invasion, however, Hitler would
be free to fully convert, the resources of the Rhineland
to the rearmament industry.

For Germany, therefore, re-

militarization of the . Rhineland'was
a necessary step to.
ward a forced revision of the territorial clauses of the
Treaty of Versailles, and the logical result of Hitler's
..
.
12
can
1 d estine rearmament program.
Although.the "spirit of Locarno" prevailed in Europe
for a decade, by 1935 it was diminishing and in 1936 it
became extinct.

German rearmament, the collapse of the

World Disarmament Conference, Germany's withdrawal from
the League of Nations, Mussolini's imperialist move
against Ethiopia, and the subsequent realignment of the
European powers all contributed to the death of Locarno
and the crisis in the Rhineland.
12 Emmerson, Rhineland Crisis, p. 239.

GP.APTER II
GERMA_~Y PREPARES
The Treaty of Versailles severelv limited the size
of Germany's armed forces.

It nermitted a small orofes-

sional army of 100,000 men to preserve order at home but
forbade the manufacture of tanks, gas, military aircraft,
and submarines.

'
Consequently:
·when Hitler came to nower,

the Reichswehr'corisisted of only ten divisions, seven of
infantry and three of cavalry'.

These were su1Jplemented

by the illegal Grenzschutzverbande, bands of volunteers
numbering about Lf5·, 000.

Despite· some secret rearmament

dating from the 1920;s, Germany's military position in
1932 was still weak.

At that time, the troon office,

the forerunner of° the Army General Staff, believed that
effective resistance to an invading
.
. . force would not be
possible before 194L,.

Some orogress had been made to-

ward the creation of an air force, but even so, in 193),
Germany nossessed only about eighty aircraft and 450
flying personnel.

The Navy had not even attained the

levels permitted by the treaty and most of the existing
.
1
era f t were nre-war vinta~e.

1William Carr, Arms, Autarkv and Aggression (New
York: W.W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1972), pp. 26, 27.
15
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Although violations of the arms limitation clauses
of the Treaty of Versailles had taken nlace under the
Weimar Republic, they were of little consequence when
com11ared with the militarv activitv which took nla.ce
when Adoloh Hitler came to nower.

When he became Chan-

cellor of the Third Reich, Hitler followed the orecedents set by the Weimar governments
but gave too nri..
..
ority to the task of rearmament, sensing the oonularitv
of such a program.

One of the first acts of his gov-

ernment was to create the Reich "Defense Council, an
organization chargecl. with the co.ordination and direction of the secret rearmament of Germany.

Under the

Fiihrer's direction, the outlawed German nfficers Corns
was resurrected ann the Generals were instructed to
carry out a three-fold exnansi9n of the Army, and to
form several armored units. 2
In spite of the Rhineland nrovisions of the Versailles treaty and the vulnerabilitv they imnlied,
there was substantial clandestine activity in the Ruhr
and Rhineland armament works, es~ecially those of Krupn
2 John W. Wheeler-Bennett, The Nemesis of Power:
The German Army in Politics 1918-1945 (New York: St.
Martin's Press, Inc., 1954), o. 308.
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and I. G. Farben.

Krupp had been forbidden by the

Allies to continue in the armament business after
1919, but the company had nevertheless not been idle.
I. G. Farben, under a similar ban, had by 1933 dis-

covered how to make synthetic rubber from coal.

By

the beginning of 1934, plans were approved by Hitler's Reich Defense Council for the mobilization of
these and some 240,000 other plants for war orders.
By the end of that year, rearmament, in all its phases,
had become so massive that it could no longer beeffectively concealed. 3 · Initially, it appears that Hitler's caution was motivated by ~ear of a hostile French
reaction, but as it'became obvious that this was not to
be forthcoming, the pace of rearmament quickened.

I;

Increased rearmament along-with consolidation of
his domestic po~vers led Hitler to consider leaving the
League of Nations.

The opportunity to do so presented

itself in the fall of 1933 when the League's disarmament
talks at Geneva stalled.

Through his diplomats, Hitler

3William L. Shirer, The Rise and Fall of the Third
Reich: A History of Nazi Germany (New York: Simon and
Schuster, 1960), p. 282.
4
Telford Taylor, ·Munich: The Price of Peace (New
York: Doubleday & Co., Inc. , 1979), p. 97.
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asserted Germany's total willingness to disarm, but not
in the face of overwhelming evidence that the other nations of Europe were unwilling to do so.

Hitler with-

drew from the League and caused the collapse of the disarmament Conference.

Hitler's move had great popular

support from his countrymen, who indicated their approval in a plebiscite held on November 12.

German with-

drawal from th_e League angered Great Britain and Italy,
but the French government was less upset.

It had lit-

tle confidence that the Germans·~ould in fact observe
any disarmament agreement they might sign and was therefore not as disturbed as others by the rupture in the
disarmament negotiations. 5
Apparent British willingness to accept German rearmament and treaty violations was responsible for encouraging Hitler to carry out .further transgressions.
On 16 March 1935, in the first of his "Saturday Surprises," Hitler reintroduced conscription and announced
that the German Army would be increased to thirty six

5 Gerhard L. Weinberg, The Foreign Policy of Hitler's·German : Di J.omatic Revolution in Euro e 193336 Chicago and London: The University of Chicago
Press, 1970), pp. 166, 167.
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divisions.

He outlined plans for an army made un of

500,000 regulars, a move which was clearly in contravention to the Treaty of Versailles an<l the Locarno uact.
As justification for his plans, the Fuhrer claimed that
the German people had laid down arms in 1918 in full
confidence that President Wilson's "Fourteen Points would
stabilize and equalize the European nations as well as
the world.

He asserted that the German neonle had placed

high hone in the League of Nations, convinced that "by
fulfilling _the disarm_ament conditions of the Treaty of
Versailles they would make possible a general interna- :_
tional disarmameI).t." _.The· victor states had, he said,
unilaterally relea·sed themselves from their obligations,
and armaments had increased everywhere.

He charged

that none of the victors were interested in fulfillment
of the Versailles disarmament nrovisions and therefore
the German people had to assume resnonsibility for their
6 For this Germany was reproached by the
own defense.
so-called "Stresa Powers," France, Italy and Britain,
who met in April in Italy, but agreed on nothing besides
condemnation of Hitler's announcement. 7
6
R. B. Mowat, Eurone in Crisis: Political Drama in
Western Eurone (Bristol, England: J. W. Arrowsmith, LTD.,
1936), p. 36.
7Goldman, "Crisis in the Rhineland," n. 15.
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The lack of concerted action by the Locarno nowers
was in large measure due to Hitler's di11lomatic maneuverings, calculated offers of enticing agr~ements, and
to his caution.

Although much of Hitler's rearmament

activity was confirmed by British and French intelligence, Berlin could often exnlain it away in very plausible terms.

Early rearmament efforts were cautious,

and insofar as possible, Hitier attem9ted to make them
.
.. ,mere·l ~ <lf
appear innocuous,
or at worst,
e .. ensi. ve. R
· Hhe-

ther this was simply rhetoric for masking his aggressive designs or whether·it indicates legitimate concern
for the defensive capabilities of . his nation, Hitler continually offered disclaimers of responsibility.

He sought

to legitimize German rearmament in the eyes of the world
by shifting the blame either to other Eurooean nations
I

in general or to France in particular.

By blaming the

French for their pact with the Soviet Union, Hitler nlayed
the trump card offered him by the French right in their
. .
opposition
tot h at agreement. 9

It has also been suggested

that a major purpose in shifting the blame was for domes. propagan d a purposes. 10
tic

8

Emmerson, Rhineland Crisis, P. 29.

9Micaud, French,,Right, pp. 85-105.
10
Weinberg, Foreign Policy, p. 241.
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Nowhere was Hitler's caution and.strategy more evident
than in the Rhineland.

Hitler discouraged overt activity

in the area, especially during the year preceding the couo.
The Reichswehr wanted to make advance preparations in the
zone, but Hitler permitted them to ma~e only those essential defensive preparations which could be concealed altogether or disguised with a cloak of legitimacy.

Into

the former category fell such activities as stock-piling
uniforms, rifles, gre~ades_ and heavy machine guns.
lery, tanks, and planes were st;rictly forbidden.

ArtilObstruc-

tion and resistance zones were set up and preparations
made for establishing as well as destroying communications
and transport networks.

Rifle ranges were hidden in na-

ture preserves and materi~l which could not be concealed
was cleverly disguised.

Observa.tion and machine guns

posts were erected as customs or fire watch towers, and
/

the construction of subterranean depots for materie!l and
munitions was disguised as mining activity.

Civilians

occupied barracks, thereby justifying maintenance.

Gli-

der and air sport clubs abounded, as a front for the
construction of air bases.

In addition to the maintenance

of a 31,500 man police force which the Versailles treatv
authorized in the zone, approximately 14,000 para-military
. . were b eing
.
. d int
.
h e area. ll
traine
Lan d espo 1 izei

11 Ernrnerson, Rhineland Crisis, P. 28.
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Significant progress was al.so being made in German
naval development.

Hitler's goal in this area was to

develop the kind of navy that would orotect Germany's
access to Swedish iron ore, safeguard communications
with East Prussia, insure control of the Baltic against
the Soviet Union, and give her the ability to threaten
the oceanic sup-ply routes of France.

While he was de-

termined to build up German naval strength, Hitler preferred not to offend the British.,

Diolomatic approaches

were made towar,d Great Britain in early 1935, indicating
Germany's willingness to negotiate an agreement limiting
Germany's naval strength to 35 percent of· that of Great
Britain. In June 1935, the British government, much to
the chagrin of the French, signed the Anglo-German Naval
Agreement which accomplished this.

As far as naval con-

struction was concerned, the agreement had no particular
significance.

Germany could and did develop its navv as

it wished, but Hitler had scored a major diplomatic triumph at no cost to Germany, and had succeeded in driving
12
a wedge between France and Great Britain.

12

weinberg, Foreign Policy, p. 211.
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The Anglo-German Naval Agreement seriously undermined
Franco-British solidarity, and in effect recognized
Germany's right to rearm.

Such an agreement imolied

tacit acceptance of German rearmament and indicated
British willingness to overlook the fact that such rearmament was forbidden by the Versailles treaty,
The Anglo-German Naval Agreement destroyed the socalled "Stresa-Front" and illustrated the differences
in diplomatic attitude between the British and French
Foreign Ministries.

Both British and French intelligence

were aware of Hitler's rearmament of Germany.

France had

more than once considered filing a complaint with the
League which would have enabled the Locarno powers to
oblige Germany to return co the status quo.

While France

was inclined not to negotiate the issue, Great Britain
believed that since Germany was going to rearm anyway,
it was in the British interest to secure in bilateral
agreements whatever limitations she could.

Even at this

early date, Hitler's record of keeping his oromises was
not spotless, and although British diolomats recognized
the fact that agreements with him were not infallible,
they were considered better than none at all. 13

13 rbid., pp. 210-214; and Shirer, Rise and Fall,
pp. 281-283.
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Throughout 1935 rearmament continued, but Hitler
and his generals agreed that the Locarno treaty afforded
them valuable protection against a French offensive in
the Rhineland and therefore did not want to endanger
that protection by overtly bellicose activity.

Germany

during this time used the Locarno agreement as a shield
behind which to rearm, and then discarded it when it was
14
believed no longer useful.
During the winter of 1935-36, the French and British both apparently harbored a considerably exaggerated
view of German military strength, but the evidence indicates that this was the impression Hitler wished to convey.

Certain records suggest that the Germans deliberately

ordered their few fighter squadrons to fly from one aerodrome to another, ~hanging their insignia from time to
time to give the impression that Hitler had a vast concentration of fighter 'aircraft equal

to

tish or French could put in the air. 15

anything the BriThis activity

considerably enhanced the already prevalent view that German rearmament had reached dangerous proportions.

At the

14Mowat, Europe in Crisis, P. 78.
15 F. W. Winterbotham, CBE, The Nazi Connection (New
York: Harper & Row, 1978), p. 13 .
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same time, there is also evidence to suggest that the
German

Chancellor was attempting to conceal the re-

armament of Germany and to proceed with great secrecy
in the Rhineland.

In spite of this apparent contra-

diction in intent, Hitler apparently succeeded simultaneously in both endeavors.

His

success can per-

haps be attributed to the already prevalent diplomatic practice in both France and Great Britain of
pretending not to notice what '"they did not want to
see.
As the year 1936. approached Hitler became increasingly convinced that his r,evisionist plans could
be carried out in the near futur'e.

He was determined

to cut away the-remaining "chains of Versailles" and
to gain for Germany a position of equality in international affairs.

Hitler was riding the crest of

popularity because of the successes of his domestic
policies.

A new Germany was being built.

Hitler had

generated a feeling of excitement among his people
and convinced them that Germany was destined for greatness.16

16

Goldman, "Crisis in the Rhineland," pp. 20, 21.
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There was no doubt in Hitler's mind that the Rhineland demilitarized zone would have to be reoccupied by
German troops.

The only question was whether it would

be accomplished when the international situation drew
attention away from such a move or when the armed forces
17
had reached sufficient strength.
The German dictator, now solidly entrenched in power, believed in the,, interdependence of internal and external policy.

In his Zweites Buch, Hitler wrote:

Domestic policy must secure the inner strength
of the people so that· it• can assert itself in
the sphere of foreign policy. Hence domestic
policy and foreign policy are not only most
closely linked but must -also mutually complement each ot,her .18
.
·
Hitler's early successes ··in foreign policy had
made him bold.

He had used the excuse of French bel-

licosity to reintroduce cons_cription in Germany, in
unequivocal contravention to· the Treaty of Versailles.
He had withdrawn from the World Disarmament Conference
in October 1933, once again blaming France, but this time
using delaying tactics and promises of peace to soften the blow

17Ibid., p. 21.
18 carr, Arms·, Autarky, p. 32, quoting Adolph Hitler,
Hitler's Secret Book, p. 34.
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and insure against reprisals.

Striking confirmation

of Hitler's ascendancy in the field of foreign affairs
had come in January 1934, when Germany signed a nonaggression pact with Poland.

This pact was a logical

extension of Hitler's anti-Marxist feelings and indicated his fear of "encirclement."

In 1932, France had

persuaded Poland
to sign
,
. a nonaggression -pact with Russia so that the Poles wo~ld not be intimidated by the
growing power of that state.' 'Hitler apparently believed that in the absence of a German agreement with
Poland, that country might be'tempted by France into
military action

against Germany.

Ironically, the pact

with Poland had the ultimate effect of actually s-peeding up the encirclement wh1ch Hitler feared by hastening Russia's rapprochement w_ith the West.

In February

1934, Russia, alarmed by the agreement between Poland
and Germany, ratified her nonaggression pact with France
and in September of that year became a member of the
League of Nations. 1 9

19 Ibid., pp. 33-35.
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Having calmed the Polish fear of German aggression and diplomatically pacified his eastern borders,
Hitler again turned his attentions westward.

While

secretly rearming Germany and laying careful plans to
increase Germany's living space, Hitler endeavored to
assure the rest of Europe that he had no intentions
of disturbing the peace.

In an attempt to allay the

fears of his western neighbors, Hitler sent German
.
.
.
emissaries to the various EuroRean embassies. Their
responsibility was to make it plain to those who were
concerned with rumors of a possible German move that
Germany had no intention of occupying the Rhineland
or in any other way breaching the peace.

In addition,

they were instructed to stress that the Germans felt
isolated by a hostile Europe, and fearful for their
own security.

They were further instructed to ascer-

tain the likelihood of a military response from any
quarter in the event of a German move in the demili20
tarized zone.
In the midst of these diplomatic maneuverings an
event occurred which would further Hitler's cause.

20 Goldman, "Crisis in the Rhineland," p. 22.

In
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October 1935,
pia.

Benito Mussolini went to war with Ethio-

This was precisely the international scene stealer

the Fuhrer needed to divert world attention from the
Rhineland.

On October 4, the day after the Italian in-

vasion began, William Shirer wrote in his Berlin Diary:
The Wilhelmstrasse is delighted. Either Mussolini
will stumble and get himself so heavily involved
in Africa that he will be greatly weakened in Europe,
whereuPon Hitler can sieze Austria, hitherto Protected by the Duce; or he wi;J_l win, defying France
and Britain, and thereunon be ripe for· a tie-un
with Hitler agai~!t the.Western democracies. Either
way Hitler wins.
· ,
Events proved this to be an accurate appraisal of the
situation.

A torrent of international criticism descended

upon Mussolini.

The League of Nations condemned Italy as

an aggressor and voted a partial embargo of strategic
items against her. 2 J Britain favored sanctions against
Italy, but desired no involvement severe enough to Precipitate armed conflict.

British public opinion indi-

cated overwhelming willingness to support the League
against Italy, in any move short of war.
amazed at the British stance.

France was

The nations that had been

uRwilling to accept responsibility for the integrity of
the Eastern European allies of France suddenly seemed
21 shirer, Rise and Fall, p. 288, quoting his Berlin
Diary, p. 43.
22 Goldman, "Crisis in the Rhineland," p. 32.
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eager to support Ethiopia, a country whose security
redounded not at all on European interests.

Coming

right after •the British abandonment of the "Stresa
Front" in the naval treaty with Germany, the antiItalian thrust of British policy was especially regretted by the French government, which had recently
signed a secret agreement with Italy to resist German aggression in Europe, particularly Austria. 23
i-, ., ~ .

I,

'

~

'·

.

'

,·

:

The disas_trous _Hoar~-Laval Plan, which was se1

.,

.•

•

..

\

cretly made by'. the British a~d- French Foreign Min-

.

isters,
cost both -,ministers'
jobs when details
.
.
.th'eir
.
of the plan were made public._

.'

.

. The agreement would

.,

have ended the conflict with ...Ethiopia,

but would

have rewarded Italy's aggressive efforts with twothirds of Ethiopia Is territory·'

British public

opinion blamed France .for the· fiasco.

This epi-

sode significantly cooled the zeal for any sort of
combined action with France. 24

23 weinberg, Foreign Policy, pp. 196, 197, 217,
218.
24

John W. Wheeler-Bennett, Munich: Prologue
to Tragedy (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce,
1948), pp. 251, 252.
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The British were unwilling to push forward against
Italy alone.

Their disenchantment with France for her

failure to support full sanctions against Italy negatively influenced British policy on the question of supporting France against Germany during the Rhineland crisis.

The significance of these developments was not

lost on Adolph Hitler.

The Ethiopian invasion had served

his purposes by drawing international attention way from
;

Europe.

It also widened the. ·breach between Britain and

France and paved the way for the Rome-Berlin axis.
Hitler's international positio~ had been strengthened by rearma~eht and his opponents weakened by quarrels among themselves.

By the summer of 1935, Hitler

believed that the time was coming when his troops could
occupy the Rhineland.

Simply to march in would not do,

however, since he was still·operating under the premise
that Germany considered herself bound by agreements
signed voluntarily but not by those imposed on her.

It

was therefore necessary to prepare a legal case against
the continued validity of the Locarno agreement.
Franco-Soviet Pact provided a convenient excuse. 25

25 weinberg, Foreign Policy, pp. 240, 241.
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France and the Soviet
threatened by the

Union, both of whom felt

growing power and

antagonism of

Hitler towards them, had agreed in May 1935 to form
a defensive alliance against possible German aggression.

The pact had to be ratified by the legisla-

tures of both countries, and since this was an infinitely more difficult task in France than in Russia,
it was not accomplished_ there until March 1936. When
Hitler learned of the pact.,

he sent memoranda to

both France and Great Britain, asserting his belief
that the proposed alliance conflicted with France's
obligations under the Locarn_o treaty and was therefore illegal.

The claim that a·Franco-Soviet trea-

ty contradicted Locarno would give Germany a perfect
pretext for violating it herself. 26
It is ironic
that the Franco-Soviet
justification and the

Pact provided both the
occasion for doing just that.

26 Goldman, "Crisis in the Rhineland,"

18.

pp. 17,

CHAPTER III
HITLER MOVES
By early 1936 Adolph Hitler was convinced that the
time was right for a move in the Rhineland.

The Fuhrer

had begun definite plans for a coup in June 1935, but
his target date was mid-1937:

This is revealed in the

minutes of the Working Committee of the Reich Defense
Council, which were used as evidence at the Nuremberg
War Crimes Trial in 1946.

Alfred Jodl told the Working

Committee that the-preparations for mobilization in the
,'

'

'

demilitarized zone were .to be kept absolutely secret and
that written records were prohib_ited.

If paoerwork was

essential, it was to· be kept in safes, and all weapons,
uniforms and other equtpment must be stored out of sight.
Administrative personnel were instructed to be cautious
and to recognize the principle that "concealment is mor·e
1
important than results."
1 Goldman, "Crisis in the Rhineland," p. 17, citing
Minutes of the Tenth Meeting of the Workini Committee.of
the Reich Defense Council, June 26, 1935, in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, Volume VII (Washington, D.C.,
1946-1948), p. 454.
33
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Only a few of Hitler·• s most trusted officials were aware
of his plan, although it was common knowledge in military circles that the rearmament of the Rhineland was an
important goal of the Third Reich.
It was in February 1936 when Hitler apparently first
told anyone outside his most intimate circle that he was
considering a move in the Rhine1and.

This decision to

reoccupy and-rearm the demili.tarized zone in no way represented the consensus of opinion-between Adolph Hitler
and his military leaders,

Th~re was also dissent from

some government officials and.members·of the diplomatic
i

corps.

,

:;.•

.

;
:

;

•

'

.

According. tloi General '"Fritz von Manstein, the Ger'\_

. . ·'

.

'

.

man generals diq nq.t demand,thEr mili 1::ary occupation and
certainly did pot intend it as~ preparation for war.
,
General Werner von
Fritsch,, ·a technical expert who had
.
'{

commanded the German Ar,my since 1934, told Hitler that
the armed forces were not yet.strong enough to take
such a risk, and warned that the affair might lead to a
major conflict.

He advtsed Hitler that if the French

retaliated with force, they would have little difficulty
in driving the Germans back, and it would be they who
would occupy the Rhineland and not the Germans. 2
2 Goldman, "Crisis in the Rhineland," p. 114, citing
Trial of the Major War Criminals, International Militarv
Tribunal (Nuremberg, 1948), Volume XV, P. 351.
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The German Ch_ancellor received support for his
plan from Hermann Goering and Joseph Goebbels, but his
uncertainty prior to the couo led him to call General
Fritsch back to hear his views again.

The General re-

peated his previous arguments, and offered to resign,
saying that he would not bear the responsibility for
the impending disaster.

Hitler assured Fritsch that the

whole responsibility
would
be ' his
.
.
. .
. own, and that if the
German forces m~t any resist8:nc_e·, they were to retreat. 3
At the }Juremberg trials, General- Manstein exoressed
the view that the
..· apprehension showp by the Generals
first aroused the· disbrust and:lcontempt which Hitler
felt toward his miii tary·'1ead~rs,. 4
Hitter's distrust and dissiitisfaction extended to
the career diplomats who shared_ the apprehension of the
military and cautioned the Fuhrer against action in the
Rhineland.

One diplomat, however, assured Hitler that

he had nothing to fear.

The former wine merchant and

opportunist extraordinaire, Joachim van Ribbentrop, ra.n
an independent extension of the German Department of
3 rbid., p. 115.
4rbid., Citing Trial, Vol~me XX, P. 603.
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State known as the Buro Ribbentrop.

In an office across

from diplomatic headquarters on Wilhelmstrasse, the flamboyant Ribbentrop conducted the Reich's foreign affairs
when ordinary channels did not suffice.

He was responsi-

ble only to the Fuhrer, and as Hicler became more and more
disenchanted with the slow-moving and tradition-bound
diplomats, Ribbentrop's influence grew.

He ingratiated

himself with Hitler and was named
Special Envoy to Great
'
.
Britain.

Ribben~rop was fluent in English and could there-

fore engage in direct and private conversation.

He con-

vinced Hitler that public opinion in Britain was favorable to Germany and that many Englishmen would adopt the
same, attitude regarding the Rhineland if they stood in
Hitler's shoes.

He also told Hitler that Great Britain

was too weak to risk any military engagement. 5
Although warned by most of his top advisors not to
undertake action in the demilitarized zone, Hitler chose
his own course.

In mid-January, Pierre Laval announced

that the long-delayed ratification debate over the

5
rbid., p. 24. The career of Ribbentrop is discussed
in Gordon A. Craig and Felix Gilbert, eds., The Diplomats
1919-1939 (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1953),
~26.
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Franco-Soviet Pact would finally occur.

This announce-

ment probably caused Hitler to seriously consider advan.
h"1s 1937 target d ate b y resurrecting
·
h'1s excuse. 6
c1ng
The legal experts at the German Foreign Ministry
may have legitimately believed that the Franco-Soviet
Pact was incompatible with Locarno.

Whether or not Hit-

ler shared this view is immaterial.

For him it was an

ideal pretext and he was not prepared to lose it by warning the French of the consequences of ratification.

He

appears to have been ~ore than:willing to trade passage
of the treaty for a r~militarized Rhineland.

Since the

previous spring, Hifler had excoriated the Franco-Soviet
'

.

.

agreement as_ .a __threat to the German people.

Having been

exposed to anti-Bolshevik arguments for more than three
years, they could reasonably be expected to regard Hit-ler' s coup as a Justifiable and prudent resoonse to ratification.

Hitler believed that the anti-Communist argu~

ments would also strike a sympathetic chord throughout
significant segments of British and French public opinion,
as well as in other European countries and in America. 7

6weinberg, Foreign Policy, p. 247.
7 Emmerson, Rhineland Crisis, pi:,. 76, 77.
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There were, in addition to this, several internFl and external factors which favored an early move.
Domestically, the arguments for action were economic,
strategic and political.

The economic situation in

Germany as a whole as not critical but there were the
beginnings of a serious tightening of the economy as
the German rearmament boom approached a state of full
employment.

There were fiscal problems involving in-

ternational currency as.well as domestic monetary difficulties.
The situation was serious enough to warrant a new
propaganda campaign to rally German public opinion behind the government·, s policies.

The old slogan of the

National Socialist Party had been "Freedom and Bread,"
but on 17 January 1936,
new slogan,

Joseph Goebbels launched a

"Guns or Butter.".

Some observers sub-

sequently argued that ·one of-the reasons for the timing of the Rhineland action was to divert the attention of the German public from the economic difficulties of the winter of 1935-1936 by a spectacular coup.

8 ,

Weinberg, Foreign Policy, pp. 245, 246.

8

39
Inside the demilitarized zone, economic conditions
had deteriorated to the point where press criticism of
the German government was becoming heated and demands
were being made for immediate relief.

Unemployment,

housing shortages, and rising costs had encouraged both
Communists and the always troublesome Rhenish separatists
to call for action.

Hitler had sent Goering and other

officials to deal with.the PFOblem, but with no success.
Because of the unrest, German industrialists viewed the
zone as vulnerab1e and either refused to build new plants
there or transferred existing ~perations to other areas
of the country.~

Because of the zone's industrial cap-

acity and potential armament production capabilities,
the Chancellor of the Third Reich could not allow the
situation to worsen.
Strategically the situa,tion had deteriorated with
the Fre~ch gov~rnment's decision to submit the FrancoSoviet Pact for ratification.

German military leaders,

already chafing over the difficulties posed by the demilitarized zone to their rearmament and army reorganization effort~,

now became concerned over the possibility

9 Emmerson, Rhineland Crisis, p. 72.
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of a clash provoked by the Soviet Union which would
oblige the French to attack the Reich.

Furthermore,

according to Constantin von Neurath's testimony at
Nuremberg, German military intelligence learned in the
winter of 1935 of the existence of French plans to attack and divide Germany by driving along the Main River
and linking up with Czech and Soviet forces advancing
from the east.

Also important were the defensive gains

made by the Reich during the re··cent months of intensive
rearmament efforts.

Although th_e German military caoa-

bility was much less remarkable than many foreign experts believed, the common international over-estimates
of Germany's land and air power worked significantly to
the Reich's advantage.

In addition, Germany's relative

military position, which had improved so dramatically,
was likely to be-less favorable in 1937, since her potential foes had begun to correct their military defi.
.
10
c1.enc1.es.

10

Emmerson, Rhineland Crisis, pp. 73, 74. This paragraph closely follows Emmerson's assessment of Germany's
strategic advantages. His sources include Documents on
German Foreign Policy, 1918-1945, Series C, Volume IV, and
Trial of the Major War Criminals, Volume XVI, pp. 677, 678,
and Volume X, p. 94. His conclusions are similar to those
drawn by E. M. Robertson, Hitler's Pre-War Policy and Military Plans 1933-1939 (New York: The Citadel Press, 1967).
Emmerson cites Robertson frequently in this section.
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Hitler also had personal and political re/lsons· for
choosing to act when he did.

His nenchant for sururises

coupled with a desire to further consolidate his position
motivllted the Fuhrer to restore military sovereignty in
the Rhineland.

It had been almost a year since he star-

tled the world by reinstituting conscription.

He now saw

further means of regenerating enthusiasm for himself and
the National Socialist Par-ty by ·c3;sting off the last of
the "chains of Versailles."

'.lihe,demilitarized zone stood

as the sole remain~ng_mµjor domestic symbol of Germany's
second-class status.

There were few Germans who would

not hail its disappearance, ·nor were they likely to regret the repudic1t ion of Locarn~ _· ll
These domestic and political considerations combined
with the favorable iuxtapos:\,tiqri of external events and

.

the apparent disunity of Germany's major opuonents to
seal the fate of the Rhineland demilitarized zone.
Abyssinian conflict paved the way.

The

As a result of Italy's

invasion of Ethiopia and Mussolini's subsequent political
isolation, the "Stresa Front" had been totally destroyed
and it now seemed possible that Italy might not be dis-

11

Ibid., pp. 74, 75; and Shirer, Rise and Fall,
pp. 231, 290-293.
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posed to fulfill her obligations as a Ruarantor against
German aggression in the demilitarized zone.

This was

all thE: more likely in view of the fact that Germany, bv
not joining in economic sanctions against Italy, had become that country's most important trading partner.

This

benevolence toward the Duce was not something Hitler intended

to go unrewarded.

Mussolini's adventure in Afri-

ca also benefitted Hitler by disrupting Anglo-French re.

lat ions.

.

'

'

:

.

The ill feeling genera_ted by the Hoare-Laval
'

affair, the belief.in Great Britain that the French were
dragging their feet ·in defense oI· the Italian aggressors,

'

'

and the convictioq in Frande.that the British were destroying the front aga.inst· ~ermany by is9lating Mussolini
and driving him into the arms of'-'the Fuhrer all worked
to Germany's advantage.
The Abyssinian crisis also proved helpful to Germanv
in other ways.

As Hit\er observed, sanctions against Italy

were not a burden eagerly borne by the nations of Europe,
and their imposition had reduced both the ability and
the willinl!,ness of the lesser powers to undertake a second such obligation.

Hitler believed he had nothing to

fear as far as economic sanctions were concerned.

As

has already been mentioned, the Ethionian invasion diverted
international attention from Germanv, but at the same time
it provided a contrast for Hitler's move.

People were dving
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in Africa; Hitler was planning a bloodless coup.

More-

over, the Afric,m venture enabled German leadeFs and
diplomats to argue that it was absurd for France to support only economic sanctions against a blatant aggressor
and then demand heavier penalties for an internal action
,
·
12
t·ha t pose d not h reat to anyones
security.

In spite of the opportunities offered by the Abyssinian conflict and the existence of a handy pretext, Hitler
would pro.bably ndt have risked his coun in March 1936 had
it not been for the wea~ness and disunity of the opposi.
13
tion.
Hitler_

watched and evaluated every move the British

and French made, searching for the points over which the
two powers could be separated.

German intelligence re-

ported in January that the new French Foreign Minister,
Pierre~_Etienne FlanditJ., sounded out the British government

12

Andre Francois Poncet, The Fateful Years: Memoirs
of a French Ambassador in Berlin,1931-19~Fr-ance,-F1ariimarion, 1946; reprinted., New Yor!Z: Howard Fertig, 1972),
pp. 235-238.
13 Emmerson, Weinberg and Shirer all make this observation and it is implicit in the writings of several other
authors as well. For examples, see Emmerson, Rhineland
Crisis, pp. 76-77; Weinberg, Foreign Policy, p. 243; and
Shirer, Rise and Fall, p. 281.
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reg'ardinp: the nosition it would take in the event of a
reoccupation of the Rhineland,

He was told it would be
llf
unto the French to make the first move.
Some of the intelligence which came to the German
foreign office indicated French determination was strong.
One report indicated that Flandin told Anthony Eden that
in the event of a flagrant breach of Locarno, France
would mobilize her .forces. 15

Nevertheless, Hitler dicl

not believe the French would respond militarily to a coun,
as long as it could not be oerceived as a nrenaration for
an attack on Frarice.
knowledge of

His confidence stemmed from his

French domestic weakness and from the con-

viction that "the French would not JT1arch without Britain,
whose desire for a militarv solution was deemed non.
16
existent.

llf Anthony Eden, Facing the Dictators, The Memoirs
of Anthony Eden Earl of Avon (Boston:
Co., 1962), p. 373.

Ho.iighton Mi ftlin

15 Goldman, "Crisis in the Rhineland," n. 27, quoting
Telegram from Charge d'~faires in France to Foreign Ministry, February 7, 1936, in Documents on c;erman Foreign Policy, 1918-1945, Series C, Volume IV (Washington, D.C.,
P152), n. 1112.
l6Emmerson, Rhineland Crisis, p. 77.
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Hitler's conviction that the French would not make
a military reloinder was reinforced bv the German Charg~
d'affaires, Dirk Forster, who had observed tbe operations
of the French government from his dinlomatic post in Paris.

He reminded Hitler that the French had reacted voci-

ferous l'y 1-1hen the Fuhrer reinstituted conscription the
orevious year, but French troops had not marched.

Now,

s6me'eleven months· later, the Reich was considerablv
s'tronger, while in.ternal developments in France had caused
a general deterioration in her abilitv and willingness
to take ac.tion . . The current ministry of Albert Sarraut
was strictly

a caretaker ~overnment whose goal was to

maintain the status quo.

~he alliance of the French

Communists with the Socialists and Radical Socialists
which formed the government titled the Ponnlar front,
led to a series of ugly leftist-rightist confrontations
throughout the· country.

In mid-February, Forster was

summoned from Paris for a meeting with the F\ihrer.

Al-

thou.e:h Forster refused to guarantee French inaction, he
expressed doubt that the Sarraut f'Overnment could sustain
resistance in the face of a coup in the Rhineland.

Equal-

ly useful during the pre-coun period were the assurances
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made to Hitler that the French people were so deeply
pacific, possibly even defeatist, that they would
fight only if France were invaded.

A "very influential"

member of the French government had said as much to
German Ambassador, Roland Koster, in December.

the

Premier

Pierre Laval had later confirmed to Koster that French
public opinion would not support military action be17
yond the frontiers of France.
Hitler's belief in France's infirmity was heightened
by t_he debate in. the Chamber of Deputies over ratification of the treaty with Russ_ia.

The proceedings, which

began on February 11 and ran through February 27, brought
fresh confirmation of the political and ideological conflicts with which France was plagued.

French editor

Charles Maurras reflected the sentiment of many rightists when he predicted that upon ratification, France
would find herself in a dilemma between acceptance of a
fait accompli in the Rhineland and the risk of defeat in

17 Micaud, French Right, pp. 69-8Lf, 87-101, 119.

l+ 7

attempting to prevent it.

It became obvious to Germany

during the debates that manv amonR the French right believed that ratification of a treaty with the Soviets
would provide justification for a retaliatory occunation
oF the Rhineland by Germany.

18

The rhetoric from the

rightists was strong enough to provoke a renroach from
Flandin on February 25 for "the dangerons thoughtlessness
of their words." 19
In spite of the Franco-Soviet alliance, Hitler
di.scounted the possibility of Russian aid to France in
the event of a German couo in the zone.

Even though he

continued to warn his cou~trv~en of the Soviet menace,
he .was convinced
that Russi'a was too nreoccunied with
.
internal problems to desire any Eurooean catastrophe,
narticularlv since "the Japanese aooeared to be awaiting
an opnortunity to attack the Soviet Union.

No other

European power: including England, was apparently considered by Hitler or his advisors as a potential source
of military supoort for France if she chose to react
forcefully to the remilitarization of the Rhinelanct. 20

18

.

Ibid., np. 6Q-84.

19 Paul Revnaucl, In the Thick of the l<'ight 1910-1945
(France, 1951;. renrint ed., New York:
Simon & Schuster,
1955), D. 123.
20

Emmerson, Rhineland Crisis, n. 80

Adolph Hitler believed, and most nf his diolomatic
advisors agreed, that the British would notohly fail ·co supoort France in the event of a German reoccuoation of the
Rhineland, they would actively seek to prevent her from
taking any action.

This confidence was based on know-

ledge of British military weakness, British desire for
an air pact with Germany, the preoccupation of the Baldwin government with do_mestic and Abyssinian affairs, and
the presen·ce in Britain of a great deal of svmpathy for
Germa·ny and resPect for the achievel'lents of the Chancellor.

Ribbentrop submitter\ a report to !-!itler in which he

detailed his. coq.vers_ation 1~ith British government officials durinp; a recent week long mission.

Neurath, too,

had visited England and sharer\ Ribbentroo's imoression
that Britain desired only cordial relations with the
.· h 21
Reic .

Bv mid-Februaiy·it apneared that Hitler was determined to reoccupy the Rhineland in the coming weeks and
that he would change his mind only if Presented with convincing evidence that a coun would nrovoke a military
response from any quarter.

None of his diplomatic or

military counselors could produce this sort of nroof.

21 rbid., pp. 82, 83.

On 2 March 1936, the military directives for the
reoccupation of the Rhineland were issued by General
von Blomberg.

On 5 March. Hitler set the date.

He

chose the coming Saturday, 7 March, in the hope of
gaining a weekend's respite before any counter moves
could be made.

On the day of the reoccuoation,the

Locarno powers were to be in.formed.

The Reichstag

would convene ,on·. that day to hear a special rnessai;e
22
from the Fi.ihrer:
The code word· for the, reoccunation of the Rhineland was ."Winterubung."

The orders nrovided for Ger-

man troons to move into ·.the Rhineland,

i oining the

local Landespolizei, already in position.

They were

to "remain after their arrival in their new stations
in such a state of readiness that they can withdraw
within an hour."

Withdrawal did not mean a return to

the status quo, however.

The orders sryecified a

.fighting retreat only as far as the Rhine if a military rejoinder was made by the West. 23

The orders

22 weinberg, Foreign Policy, po, 251, 252.
23

Donald Cameron Watt, "German Plans for the Reoccupation of the Rhineland: A Note," Journal of Contemporary History I, No. l, (October 19D6) : ryp. 193199.
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indicute that Hitler was prenared to go to war to keen
the zone, once it had been occupied.

It is imoortant

to note, however, that the orders were issued under the
assumption that military onnosition would not be forthcoming.
On 7 March, as planned, German Croons marched into
the demilitarized zone of the Rhineland.

Hitler hacl.

carefully surveyed the international situation, made his
plans and carried them out.
move was unopposed.

His timing was exact.

His

CHAPTER IV
FAIT ACCOMPLI
Most of the soldiers involved in Winterubun(! knew
nothing of their missions until they reached the edge of
the demilitarized zone on the morning of 7 March.

Hitler

had maintained the secrecy of his plans by involving a minimum of persons in planning the operations.

It appears

that he confided in.only nine peoole during the weeks oreceding the coup._ ·Those who were consulted or charged with
preparing for ·the action were either trusted colleafues or
diplomats who had beeri threatened if they did not keel) silent.

Most of the diplomats were informed less than twelve

hours before the move .began and military prenarations were
delayed as long as possible.

The same sort of secrecv was

maintained w.ith the German press.

Members of Hitler's cab-

inet were informed on the night of 6 March, when he presented his decision to remilitarize the Rhinelanrl as a
fait accompli and urged the government ministers to keep
their nerve in the face of foreign reactions. 1
1
Emmerson, Rhineland Crisis, pp. 101-102, citing the
private papers of Friedrich Hossbach, "7.wischen Wehrmacht
.and Hitler, 1934-1938," (Gcittingen, 1965), pp. 97,98;
Trial, Volume XI, p. 39; and various other documents, primarily from private collections of German officials and
diplomats.
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Dy the time the Saturday morning mist had risen,
Germon troops had entered the demilitarized zone.

The

Fuhrer called a special session of the Reiehstag to
announee his plan and the speech he oresented that morning was broadcast all over Europe.

While Adoloh Hitler

thundered before a stunned audience, infantry, artillery,
motorized cavalry, tanks, machine gun units, anti-aircraft
artillery and other.paraphernalia of modern warfare were
crossing the Rhine bridges.

As Hitler declared the death

of the. Locarno pact, German troops goose-stepoed into the
2
Rhine land·.
The troop movement total led between twenty
five an·d thirty five .thousand men. 3
In~ ~peech ·that lasted niriety minutes, Hitler
attacked the Treaty of Versailles, blamin~ it for the
ills of Eurooean society in general and Germany in particular:
In the year 191-9, when the Peace Treaty had been
signed, I took upon myself the duty of solving
(the German) question.
Not because I wanted to
iniure France or anv other state but because the
German peoole cannot permanently bear the wrong
which has been done to them.
They shall not bear
it and they will not bear it.

2 New York Times, March 8, 1936.
3Goldrnan, "Crisis in the Rhineland," o. 121.
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Hitler declared that the peace treaty had forced
Germany into a position of inequality among nations, a
situation which had eroded the confidence and stability
of both the German people and their government.
cited his own efforts to restore these qualities.

He then
Once

he had achieved this, the newly recovered German sense
of honor demanded the destruction of the state of inequality.
In view of th~ fact that the idea.of inequality
had become so:roo.ted "in the minds of our neighbors·, it ·was naturally difficult to show that the
restoration of. German equality was not only unharmful to them, but that on the contrary it was,
in the last analysis, ,an international benefit.
You, my fellow members of the Reichstag know how
hard was the road that I have had to travel since
30 January·l933 in order to free the German people
from the dishonourable position in which it found
itself and to secure equality of rights steo hy
step-without thereby alienating Germany from the
oolitical and economic commonwealth of European
nations, and particularly without creating new
ill-feeling from the aftermath of old enmities.
There .will come a time when I may appeal to history for confirmation of the fact that at no
moment of my struggle on behalf of the German
people,have I ever forgotten the duty incumbent
on me and on us all to uphold European culture
and European civilization .
In these three years I have again and again endeavored-unfortunately too often in vain-to throw a
bridge of understanding across to the oeople of
France.
The German people have no interest
in seeing the French peoole suffer. And on the
other hand what advantage can come to France when
Germany is in misery?
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Hitler went on to excoriate Bolshevism and to
chastise the French for entering into an alliance with
"those who preach world revolution."

He then praised

his own efforts to rid Germany of the Bolsheviks.

He

criticized the French "pactomania" and insisted that
Germany was not a threat to any of her neighbors, and
declared that he continually sought peaceful solutions
to problems, favored disarmament and had even gone so
far as to· seek an agreement with the British which severely limited German naval development.
Hitler· then· spoke of the Treaty of Locarno and of
the· sac_rifice whicJ:t Germany had made by joining in the
pact.

Th~ Treaty of Locarno, he said:
was intended to prevent for all future time the
employment of force between Belgium and France
on the one· side, and Germany on the other.
Unfortunately the treaties of alliance that had
already been made by France were the first obstacle~ lain iti the practical path of this Pact,
namely the Rhine Pact of Locarno. ,., To this
Pact Germany made a contribution which represented the greatest sacrifice; because while
France fortifies her frontier with steel and
concrete and armament, and garrisoned it heavily, a condition of complete defencelessness was
imposed unon us on our Western frontier.
Nevertheless, ;.,e abided by that obligation in the
hope that we might serve the cause of European
peace and advance international understanding by
making a sacrifice which meant so muc_h for a great
power.

,',This refers to the Rhineland provisions of the treaty.
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The agreement concluded between France and Russia
last year, and already signed and accented by the
French Chamber, is in onen contradiction to this
Pact.
This new Franco-Soviet Agreement introduces
the threatening military power of a mighty emnire
into the centre of Eurone by the roundabout way of
Czechoslovakia, the latter ·country having also·
signed an agreement with Russia.
·
Hitler reiterated his desire for an understanding
with the French, once again charging them with unwillingness to seek common ground with Germany.

He then read

to' the Reichstag a memorandum to the French government.
It-had been.prepared earlier and was to be distributed
to the Ambassadors of all the Locarno nations as he spoke.
The memorandum said, in part:

1.

It is an undisputed .fact that the FrancoSoviet Pact is.exclusively directed against
· Germany.
··
2.
It is an undisputed fact that in the Pact
France undertakes, in the event of a conflict
betwe·en Germany and the Soviet Union, obligations which go far beyond her duty as laid down
in the Covenm1t of the League of Nations, and
which compel her to take military action against
Germany when she cannot appeal either to a recommendation or to an actual decision of the Council
of the League.
3.
It is an undisputed fact that France, in such
a case, claims for-herself the right to decide on
her own judgement who is the aggressor.
4.
The German Government are now constrained to
face the new situation created by this alliance,
a situation which is rendered more acute by the
fact that the Franco-Soviet Treaty had·been sunplemented by a Treaty of Alliance between Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union exactly parallel in
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form. In accordance with the fundamental right
of a nation to secure its frontiers and ensure
its possibilities of defense, the German Government have today restored the full and unrestricted sovereignty of Germany in the demilitarized zone of the Rhineland.
Hitler then read

Germary' s proposals "for the cre-

ation of a system of peaceful security for Europe."
These included German willingness to enter into negotiations with France and Belgium on the sub_iect of a
new zone, demilitarized on both sides of the border;
the formulation of a.twenty-five year non-aggression
pact between-Germany, France, and Belgium, with Great
Britain and Italy as guarantors; a similar agreement
with· the Netherlands; an air pa_ct with the Western
powers; non-aggression pacts with the Eastern European states, provided :·that Lithuania would respect
the autonomy of the.Memel Territory; and willingness
to re-enter the League of Nations.
The Chancellor concluded his oration with a glowing defense of his own efforts on behalf of the German
people.

He urged them to give him a vote of confidence:

I now beg the German people to strengthen me in
my faith and through the force of their will
further to endow me with the strength to take
a courageous stand at all times for their honour
and their freedom and their economic welfare.
And I specially request the German people to
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support me in my struggle to bring about real
peace_ li
On 8 March 1936, the New_ Yorl< Times printed the
full text of Hitler's speech and indicated that his
oratory efforts were rewarded with a five-minute stand-·
ing ovation.
While Hitler spoke, the German Foreign Minister,
Baron von Neurath, received the ambassadors of Great.
Britain, France, Italy ·and Belgium and handed each a
copy of the Chancellor's memorandum. 5

In the Rhine-

land, as the sold_iers of the Reich entered the various
towns and cities in which they would be stationed,
crowds pou_red in to· the streets to greet them.

Flags

app.eared at windo'ws, church bells rang, bands played,
and young girls showered the marching soldiers with
flowers.

In Cologne, the troops Paraded in Cathedral

Square, and in Frankfurt's Roemer Square, a Nazi rally was held.

Two hours after Hitler finished his ad-

dress advance units had reached Saarbrucken, only
three kilometers from the French border. 6

4 Norman H. Baynes, The Speeches of Adolph Hitler
April 1922-August 1939 (New York: Howard Fertig, 1969),
pp. 1271-1302.
5Mowat, Europe in Crisis, p. 47.
6 Newsweek, Vol. VII, No. 11, (March 14, 1936): 7,8.
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The German government announced that trooo movements
would continue throughout the next day and that soldiers
would be stationed on the Rhine, in the Rhine \/alley, and
between the Black Forest and the Rhine.

Aachen, Trier

and Saabri.icken were to be garrisoned "lightly," and Air
Force squadrons were to be stationed at Cologne, Dusseldorf, Frankfort-am-Main, and Mannheim.

An apoeal was

is~~ed·to the German nation by the Minister of Propaganda,
Joseph.Goebbels.

He urged the citizens of the Reich to

fly German flags as a symbol of their unity with those
Germans who had died durin'g the World Har, whose sacrifice was no longer in vain.

7

As night· fell over Germany·on 7 March, torch light
parades lit un the skies in cities all over the country.
In Berlin, 15,000 Bro~shirts oassed between cheering
.

,'

,

crowds and paraded down Wilhelmstrasse.

Hitler and his

cabinet reviewed them from the balconv of the Chancellory and listened while the marchers sang the familiar
Horst Wessel Lied, "Today all Germany belongs to us.
Tomorrow the whole world." 8

7 New York Times, March 8, 1936.
8 Newsweek, Volume VIII, No. 11, (March 14, 1936):
7,8; Goldman, "Crisis in the Rhineland," o. 133.
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International reaction was immediate.

The Sunday

New York Times carried banner headlines:
"HITLER SENDS GERJ-AAN TROOPS INTO RHINELAND; OFFERS
PARIS 25-YEAR NON AGGRESSION PACT; FRANCE MANS HER
PORTS; BRITAIN STUDIES MOVE"
In articles covering the entire front page and several
full pap;es throughout the paper, British, French, Russian
and other European reactions were recorded.

The British

seemed non-plussed, the French outraged, and the Russians
angry but hot surprised.
these er.1otions.

Americans seemed to share all of

The Times' foreign correspondents repDrt-

ed their observations in detail.

From Berlin, Otto D.

Tolischus ·wrote,
The move was carri.ed through with that characteristic German efficiency which drew from foreign
military experts tribute to the German Army Command amid manifestations of both ponular enthusiasm and grave apprehension. It.brought back
echoes of the last German westward march nearly
22 years ago, but also it was made to look like a
dress rehearsal for more serious business.
The London correspondent wrote:
Anthony Eden used strong words to condemn the German action.
. He said the British Government must
consider entry of German re~ular trooos into the
forbidden zone to be in defiance of treaty obligations and a flagrant breach of a territorial frontier.
'
He apparently had studied the situation carefully and his
analyis was proved correct by subsequent events.
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The fact is that at the bottom of their hearts
Cabinet Ministers here are not so displeased
with Hitler's proposals as it officially must
be said they are.
For some time past the demilitarized zone has been written off as lost.
A chance to obtain a solid counter-value for a
hopeless item on the balance sheet appears
attractive for practical politicians in London.
The real question awaiting reply is
whether Hitler offers advantages that upon
closer inspection may be found ephemeral
once the fact of the illegal military occupation of the Rhineland is accepted without
demur.9
Experts from Europe'an press releases follow:
From the Red Star, an Army organ of Moscow:
The Rhine invasion is a new symbol of aggression,
making Germany the hotbed o.f war throughout Europe.
The .invasion and the Locarno Pact repudiation cannot be justified: With unparalleled insolence Hitler said each German had 18 nercent less land than
each Russian .. Hitler has o·ften_ revealed that Fascist Germany is dreaming of acquiring Soviet territory - Let him only try it'.
The Paris Independent:
Hitler's present action continues in logical succession.the Versailles Treaty violations because
the Allied Governments are divided.
The Amsterdam Telegraaf:
Germany invites Holland to particiD1?,te in its
proposals, but Holland cannot enter into an
agreement which would place her in the dangerous
position of Belgium.

9 New York Times, March 8, 1936.
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The Vienna Reichspost:
The announcement of Germany's readiness to reenter
the League of Nations is aimed to achieve favorable
reaction in England, where such is considered most
important, due to the Italo-Ethiopian situation.
Journal de Geneve, Switzerland:
It is clear that Hitler is playing for high stakes.
He is capitalizing on the confusion into which
France and Britain were thrown by Mussolini's action
in Ethiopia, and the German press is using ratification of the Franco-Soviet agreement as justification
for these actions.
The Berlin Deutsche Allegemeine Zeitung:
.

.

We are.still ignorant of who will excite himself
over Hitler's speech, but we suspect it will be
France; but particularly toward France the Fuhrer
directed a passionate appeal for reconciliation.
The· London Sunday· Observer:
Hitler's two new points are the suggestion that the
covenant of the League of Nations should be completely disjoined from the Treaty of Versailles, and
that the Rhineland should honestly be recognized
as German fully and without impediment.
On both
points he is right. There can be no peace without
elementary justice and common sense. There is no
more reason why German territory should be demilitarized than there is that French, Belgian or
British territory should be demilitarized. 10

lOLi.terary Digest, Vol. 121, No. 11 (March
p. 12.

Li,

1936),
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The London Times expressed similar sentiments, but with
reservations:
Though the realization of the constructive aims outlined in Germany's memo is greatly to be desired, it
"is felt that the short cut of easy complacency towards Hitler's violation of solemn treaty pledges
might prove to be the longest and perhaps
di~astrous
road.
Great Britain has held France to the League
covenant and the policy of collective action in Abyssinia.
She is in honour bound to remain true now to her
own pledges in full considertion of France.11

a

European condemnation was swift, but reserved.

No one

appeared ready to condone Germany's action, yet Hitler's
offers· o_f harmony and agreement led many to consider the
possibility of a trade - the Rhineland for peace.

What-

ever else can be s_aid about th_e ,Rhineland crisis, it cannot .be said that the British and French governments were
taken by surprise.

Niether were Germany's other neighbors,

and although most of the European governments appeared to
be outraged by the remilitarization of the Rhineland,
their bellicose words were not translated into action.
Their responses were, for the most part, rhetorical.
Both Great Britain and France had suspected for some
time that Germany might rearm the area.

If the move had

been anticipated, why had these two governments not formulated a policy to deal with the threat?

11 The Times (London), _March 9, 1936.

The evidence indi-
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cates that some contingency olanning had been done, but
the key to the responses of Great Britain and France lay
largely in their differing interpretations of what constituted a threat to their own national interests and indeed as to what posed a potential threat to the peace of
Europe.

The British had pinned their hopes for peace

basically upon reconciling Germany to a status quo, sufficiently revised to. meet_Germany's legitimate aspirations.

Thisstance is reflected in Britain's position that

Germany's move in the Rhineland was just a march in Hitler's own back yard.

The French, on the other hand, hqd

attempted to increase.·their strength by means of a broadened ·alliance syseem, pinning their hopes for peace on the
ability to confront Germany with such overwhelming power
that it would not dare attack France. 12

The lack of con-

certed opposition insured the success of Hitler's coup and
allowed him to diplomatically stall until his march was
indeed a fait accompli.

12

Frederick H. Hartmann, The Relations of Nations
(New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc., 1978), o.

368.

CHAPTER V
EUROPE REACTS
The remilitarization of the Rhineland was a clearcut unilateral violation of international treaties.

By

reoccupying the demilitarized zone, Germany was in contravention not only of the Treaty of Versailles, which Hitler
maintained had b,een imposed on Germany, but also of the
Pact of Locarno, which had been freely negotiated with the
governments of France ·and Belgium and guaranteed
governments of Grea~t Britain and_ Italy.

by. the

As a result of

Germany's move, France now had every legal right anct certainly every military reason to undertake an occupation of
the Rhineland.

In spite of these facts Hitler's move went

unopposed.
From the moment of the German announcement, Hitler
seemed virtually assured of victory, for although the nations of Europe reacted with surprise and dismay, none
took military action.

As the nation most directly af-

fected by the German move, France was entitled to unilateral military action as well as a request for assistance
from the guarantors of Locarno.
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If France hesitated, the
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initiative rested with Great Britain and Italy, the
guarantor powers.

Italy was under sanctions as a re-

sult of the Abyssinian embroglio, therefore responsibility fell implicitly to Great Britain, a nation which
was not inclined to support military action as a means of
settling the dispute.
If a forceful reaction was to be made, responsibility
for making it clearly rested with the French government,
and there weLe several .courses of action which it could
take.

The French· c'oul:d ignore the Locarno p'act and march

into all or. part of the Rhineland on the grounds that this
was permitted by,·Art'icle 44 of the Versailles t'reaty, which
stated that any violation'of the Rhineland provisions was
to be regarded as "a hostile
the peace of the_world."

-act, calculated to disturb

Another alt~rnative was to post-.

pone action until the League of Nations could convene and
make a determination in the case.

If the League found in

favor of France, she could then either impose military
or economic sanctions against Germany and call upon the
Locarno guarantors for assistance, or forego her right to
determine punishment independently and submit the question
to her treaty partners for a joint decision. 1

1Ernmerson, Rhineland Crisis, p. 48.
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France was entitled to military action, and some
French officials at least considered such a move. The
French Ambassador in Berlin, Andre Francois-Poncet, urged
"energetic reaction."
of stern.defiance:

Premier Sarraut broadcast a message

never would France negotiate while

Stra~bourg was menaced by German guns.

But the Commander-

in-Chief of the French army, General Maurice Gamelin,
warned his government that a war operation, however limited, would necessitate a general mobilization, a step he
was not wil].ing to take.

He did agree to rush thirteen

divisions to the Maginot Line, and even this pusillanimous gesture provoked General von Blomberg into begging
Hitler to at least withdraw troops from the cities closest
to the French frontier, Aachen, Trier, and Saarbrucken.
If the· French attacked, Blomberg told Hitler; the Germans
would have to pull back without a battle, and thus suffer
a humiliating moral as well as military defeat.
remained resolute.

Hitler

He told Blomberg to wait, if necessary,

they could retreat tomorrow. 2

2

John Toland, Adolf Hitler, Volume I (Garden City,
New York:
Doubleday & Co., INc., 1976), pp. 407, 40R.
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The issue of retreat is a c0ntroversial one.

As

has previously been mentioned, the orders for Winteri.ibung
stated that the troops were to stage a "fighting withdrawal" if opposition was encountered.

Hitler apparently

did not believe that France would intervene, and many
historians write that the German troops would have fled
the Rhineland-had a shot be~n fired against them.
German Chancellor· certainly pondered retreat.

The

On 5 March,

he -.asked his adjutant, Friedrich Rossbach, whether the
movement of.tro~ps could still be halted and when such
a decision would become irrevocable.

Rossbach replied

that the movement of troops could still be stopped,
but he could not say when the latest time for reaching
a final decision might be. 3

Testimony at the Nuremberg

Trials indicated ·that Hitler was resolved to withdraw
the occupation forces as soon as France adopted a
menacing stance. 4 But as the weekend passed, the possibility of a forced retreat became more remote.

3

Goldman, "Crisis in the Rhineland," p. 118, citing
Friedrich Rossbach, Zwischen Wehrmacht und Hitler 19341938 (Wcilfenbuttell, 1949), p. 97.
4 rbid., citing Trials, Volume XV, p. 351.
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By Monday, 9 March, more than 25,000 German troons
were in the Rhineland.

While there were still only

words from the British and French governments, the German Chancellor was consumed by anxietv.

He later con-

fided to his chief interpreter, Paul Schmick, that "the
forty-eight hours after the march in the Rhineland were
the most nerve-racking of my life."
had the French retaliated,

He also said that

"we would have had to with-

draw with our tails between our legs,

for the military

resources at our disposal would have been wholly inadequate for even a moderate resistance."5
Indeed, Hitler's

anxiety was such that he shared

it with one of his favorites, Albert Speer.

In his

memoirs, S-peer recalls the evening of March 7:
The special train in which we rode to Munich
on the evening of that day was charged, compartment after compartment, with the tense
atmosphere that emanated from the Fuhrer's
section. At one station a message was

5

Toland uses these quotes on p. 408 without a
citation. However, Hitler's anxiety is discussed
by Carr, Arms Autarkv, p_ 67, and the conversation
is referred to indirectly.
Carr cites P. Schmidt,
Statis auf diplomatischer Buhne, 1923-1945 (Frankfurt, 1949), p. 230; and K. von Schuschnigg, Ein
Requiem Rot-Weiss-Rot (Zurich, 1946), o. 43.
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handed into the car. Hitler sighed with relief.
'At l_ast '. The King of England will
not intervene. He is keening his promise.
That means it can all go weli.'
seemed
not to be aware of the meager influence the
British crown has upon parliament and the
government. Nevertheless, military intervention would have probably required the
King's approval, and perhaps that is what
Hitler meant to imply. In any case, he was
intensely anxious, and even later, when he
was waging war against almost the entire
world, he always termed the remilitarization of the Rhineland as the most daring
of his undertakings.
'We had no army worth
mentioning; at that time it would not even
have·had the fighting strength to maintain
·itself against the Poles. If the French
had taken-any action, we would have been
easily defeated; our resistance would have
'been over in a few days. •6

He

· The causes- o.f Hi'tler's anxiety were evidently
illfounded, in _spite of the fact that Germany's chances
in the event of a full-scale French attack seemed hope-_
less .. The Rhineland action was no hastily conceived
leap in the dark. · ·Hitler had carefully appraised his
opponents.

Not_only were French and British leaders

preoccupied with Ethiopia, but their reaction to Mussolini's aggression in that country had convinced Hitler that they possessed a general oaralysis of will
and a reluctance

to resort to

any type

of seemingly

6
Albert Speer, Inside the Third Reich:
(New York: Macmillan Co., 1970), p. 72.
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extreme and therefore dangerous measures in moments of
crisis.

The Chancellor had also chosen his time well.

The French domestic situation militated against concern
over foreign affairs.

Hitler believed that the current

French leadership lacked the resolution and the nerve· to
undertake an invasion of Germany, and if France did not
react forcibly to a situation so vital to her interests,
then Great Britain.was most unlikely to do so.
Chancellor's

The

concerns- prior to the coup were not whether

France 'could'., but whether it 'would' march.

Having con-

vinced himself that the French would not move to stop him
he

proceeded with the remilitarization of the Rhine-

land.

Although Hit'ler was convinced that France would

not act unilaterally, he did remain concerned about some
kind of jointaction against Germany.

He therefore con-

centrated on dissuadi~g _ French allies from choosing
such a course of action.

This could be accomplished, he

believed, by promising to rejoin the League of Nations
and to engage in bilateral agreements with his neighbors.
Hitler believed the British could easily be convinced that
the Rhineland effort was purely a German internal affair,
and no threat to Britain or to the peace of Europe. 7

7

Rich, Hitler's War Aims, pp. 86, 87.
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To justify his actions and allay the fears of his
European neighbors, Adolph Hitler accompanied the remilitarization of the Rhineland with a massive propaganda
campaign.

The German action, he said, had been under-

taken in response to the ratification of a French alliance with Russia.

This agreement, he charged, had com-

pletely upset the existing European balance of power and
negated all the political and legal conditions under which
the Treaty of Locarno had been concluded.

He defended

Ge.rmany' s right to sovereignty over its own territory.
The remilitarization of the Rhineland, besides being
essential. to German national security, was no more than
an assertion-of.that right and a step toward securing
justice for Germany.

He reiterated his desire for peace

and again offered to negotiate a series of new agreements
.

which would guarantee the peace of Europe.

8

Hitler's anxiety soon turned to exhilaration.
gamble had been successful.

His

The French and British gov-

ernmentsprotested, as they had done the previous year when
he announced his plans to rearm Germany and conscript

8

rbid., p. 87.
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an army, but again they did nothing.

Britain deplored the

breach of treaty, but did not see in Hitler's action a
threat to peace.

France dec:irledthat unilateral military

resistance would be futile.

Hitler held the weakest hand

in the game, yet he had bluffed England and France into
acceptance of his coup
disapproval.

with little more than a murmur of

This is all the more astonishing given the

stakes of the game.
The remilitarization of the Rhineland was one of the
boldest and most momentous gambles of Adolph Hitler's career.

He destroyed in one blow the major strategic ad-

vantage that the Allies had won as a result of their victory•in'the First World War.

Hitler's action affected

France most directly, because in the event of another conflict, German forces would be poised directly on the French
border', while conversely, the French would be deprived
of the advantage of being able to strike at Germany through
a demilitarized zone.

That this zone was also the indus-

trial heartland of Germany was hardly incidental.
Hitler's action was also a blow to the small states
of Eastern Europe for it virtually eliminated France's
ability to come to their aid in the event of a German
attack in that area.

Poland and the nations of the Little

Entente immediately declared their support for French military action.
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On the day of the remilitarization, the Polish
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Josef Beck, asked the
French Ambassador in Poland to relay to Paris the message that his country understood the difficult position
of France and was ready to carry out its alliance obligations.

The message was sent with the full approval of

the President, the Inspector General of the Armed Forces
and the Premier.

The Poles considered the chances of

armed reaction on the part of France extremely small, yet
they.advised the Ge~mans of the position they had taken.
The __ Polish Envoy-·to Berlin info1;med the German government
that his country's non-aggression agreement with Germany
did not restrict Polish freedom of action within the.f~anework of the French alliance ..

The Poles later charged that

Pierre Flandin did not notify his government of the Polish
declaration, possibly.because he was concerned that the
stand

taken by Poland might strengthen the position
of French cabinet members who favored military action. 9

9waclaw Jedrzejewicz, ed., Diolomat in Paris, 19361939: Pll_!)_ers and Memoirs of Juliusz Lukasiewicz Ambassador of Forand (New York and London: Columbia University
Press, 1970), pp. 8, 9,
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On the surface, the Polish reaction was impeccably
loyal, but it has been suggested that Beck was convinced
that France would not resort to force, so he could safely
make promises which he would never be· called upon to fulfill .10
In any event, when it became evident that France
would not take military action, the Poles found themselves
in a difficul.t situation w;i.th regard to Germany.
than a week, the Polish policy was reversed.

In less

Although

Poland may have bE:_en willing to march against Germany,
she couldI .not afford to wait while France vacillated. 11
Th_e ! C_zechoslovaki_an government also offered support
when the1Rhineland occupation took place.
: I
I

Czech Presi-

.,

dent E'duard Benes told the French Minister in Prague that

I

- -

his country ''.woul·d fo1low France, in accordance with our
C

treaty obligations, if she should draw the logical conc1usion from Hitler's act."

As in the case of Poland;

days passed and it became apparent that the French government was not going to take up the Czech offer of military
aid.

So the Czechs, like the Poles, began to change course,
10
11

Taylor, Munich, p. 190.
Goldman, "Crisis in the Rhineland," pp. 211-213.
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because they realized that they were going to have to
deal with Hitler in the future, probably with little
assistance from the French government. 12
The Rumanian Foreign Minister, Nicolae Titulescu,
conveyed assurances of his country's support as well,
and became extremely critical of the French government
when it failed to react forcibly. 13 Similar statements
came from Hungary and Yugoslavia. 14
In spite of their willingness to support military
action, France's inaction made it necessary for the nations of Eastern Europe to adjust their foreign policy
to one·of accommodation.with the Third Reich.

The real-

ity of their impotence was heightened by their total inability to form a concerted opposition among themselves.
Economic ties with Germany played an important part in
their reluctance to take an overtly anti-German position
in the face of French inactivity, and many of the Eastern
European countries believed it would be economically suicidal for them to carry out sanctions against Germany.

12 Ibid., p. 214.
13
Elizabeth Cameron, Prologue to Appeasement: A
Studi in French Foreign Policy 1933-36 (Washington, D.C.
American Council on Public Affairs, 1942). p. 199.
14
Goldman, "Crisis in the Rhineland," p. 219.
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Even though most of these countries were sympathetic to
the French position, they believed far-reaching changes
were about to be made in the European political scene and
therefore they did not want to pre~udice their cases in
15
advance.
A similar reaction occurreil in the Netherlands.

Al-

though Hclland shared a common border with Germany and her
s~curity was greatly affected by the remilitarization, she
hesit.ated
. .
. to condemn the. German move.

Her actions are typ-

ic~l of the small states who claimed neutrality.

Their

weakness and size made it much easier to turn over the
problem to the large:i;- powers than to suffer the consequences
of taking a hard line."

The Netherlands' economic life

depended to a large extent on exports to Germany, anrl
the Third Reich ow,ed that country a large sum of money .16
The Soviet Union was also affected by the remilitarization of.the Rhineland.

The Russians were aware of

the strategic importance of a demilitarized zone in the
Rhineland.

They knew once the region was occupied and

fortified by German troops, France woul.d be effectively
blocked from aiding her Central and Eastern European allies

15 Ibid.
16 Ibid . , p . 219 .
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if Hitler struck towards the east.

If Eastern Europe

fell under Nazi domination, Russia would no longer have
a buffer between herself and the Third Reich.

Conse-

quently, Joseph Stalin ordered the Soviet Ambassador in
Paris to see Flandin on the day of the reoccupation and
to offer him support in any move which

France decided

to make. 17
During the Weimar period, the Soviet Union and Germany nad ·enjoyed a close relationship, which
secret mili·tary agre~ments, but

included

this relationship had

been· destroyed.when'Hitler outlawed the German Communist
Part arid violently
Bolshevism as
.
.attacked
.
foremost menance!

the world's

Hitler's move led Stalin to adopt a

policy_of coop~ration with various European anti-Fascist
elements, one resuJt of which was the Franco-Soviet Pact.
The Rus.sians urged action during the

Rhineland crisis,

stating that· the Rhineland coup was not an isolated incident, but rather one of a series of acts motivated by
an aggressive spirit and if it went unpunished, the results would be d·isastrous.

However, the reality of French

inaction made it necessary for them to adjust their policy
to one of accommodation, just as the Eastern European na-

17 Max Beloff, The Foreign Policy of Soviet Russia,
1936-1941, Volume II (London, New York: Oxford University Press, 1949), p. 50.
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tions were doing.

The Chairman of the Council of Peo-

ple's Commissars, Vyacheslav Molotov, indicated his nation's official position in the French newspaper Le Temps
on 12 Ma.rch:
The main trend among our people . . . considers an
improvement in relations between Germany and the
Soviet Union possible.
. The participation of
Germany in the League of Nations would be in the
interests of peace and would be favorably regarded
by us.18
·
The Rhineland ·episode points up the weaknesses in the
Franco-S_oviet _Pact.

The agreement required France and

Russia to assist 'each other in the event of r::erman aggression.

Biit the pact was pure _illusion-it had no

specifi~ military provisibns, and it did not require the
U.S.S.R. to interv·ene if-Germany attacked Poland, or any
of the eastern allies of France.

The ma.Jar weakness how-

ever, was that Russia, having no common border with Germany, could do nothing against the Reich, exc~pt through
Poland, and there,fore could act only with Poland's consent, and given the history of Polish-Soviet relations,
this was extremely unlikely.

From two viewpoints, there-

fore, the Soviet alliance was useless.

If the Germans

invaded Poland, the Russians were not obliged to inter-

18 rbid., p. 53

79

vene, since their. alliance was with France.

If Germany

attacked France, Poland could refuse transit of Russian
troops through her territory, and render the two-front
response unworkable.

The alternatives were air support,

which was impractical as well as virtually non-existent,
or an illegal march through hostile or at best, neutral
territory. 19
The Savi.et Union was committed by se"[)arate treaty
to come to the aid of Czechoslovakia in the event of German aggression,· but this was also contingent upon a
French response.

0

Th e Soviet connection can be briefly

summarized . . If Great Britain and therefore France adooted a hard line p·oiicy against Germany, the Soviets were
willing to ioin the contest, either by marching through
Rumania or by forcing their way through Poland, but only
if the·western democracies were intent on crushing Germany.

The Ru-~stans harbored

a dismal view of both French

military capacity and willingness to react forcefully and
believed it extremely unlikely that they would soon become
. .
. h osti· 1·ities.
.
20
a participant
in

19 Rene Lauret, France and Germanv: The Legacv of
Charlemagne (Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1964), p. 119.
20
Taylor, Munich, pp. 454-1+56.
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As a .nation which bordered on the newly remilitarized Rhineland, Be]gium was of necessity involved in
the crisis which arose over Germany's activity there.
The coup in the Rhineland reminded many Belgians of the
1914 affront suffered at the hands of their neighbor
to the east.

Because of the dreadful experiences of

Be]g:ium at that. time, she had signed a military agreement with France in 1920, ·a move designed to protect
h'?r against another military incursion by Germany. Despite these past. experiences, the Belgian government acted
in a· restraine_d manner when the Rhineland crisis occurred.
Belgian·Prime Minister Paul van Zeeland declared in a
radio· broadcast_ from London on 13 March that Belgium
had done nothing to justify a breach of the Locarno Treaty and t,hat the reduction of his country's security was
.
21
deplorable.
Van Zeeland steered Belgium on a middle course during the crisis, and actually became a mediator between
France and Great Britain in their efforts to deal with
the breach of treaty.

Although Belgium was cast in the

role of mediator, she insisted that she be compensated

21
The New York Times, March 14, 1936, p. 8.
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for her loss of security in any new agreement which the
Locarno powers might make.

Several internal political

considerations influenced the direction of Belgian foreign policy during the Rhineland crisis.

Many among Bel-

gium's Flemish population believed that a close association with France would involve Belgium in a war.

Bel-

gian conservatives opposed the Franco-Soviet Pact, and
the Belgian Fasci~t.Party·was rapidly gaining adherents.
The failure.of France to act decisively when her own interests were ~o. clearly threatened led these three groups
to call for a disentanglement
of ' Belgium from French for~
.
eign policy.

Although Belgium would probably have suo-

po~ted French action in 1936 as she did in the Ruhr occupation of 1923, the pressure brought to bear on the Belgiij.ri governnient ultimately resulted in a policy of neutrality, which unfortunately for the Belgians was to be
as beneficial in 1940 as it had been in 1914. 22
The other Locarno signatory, Italy, was also to feel
the impact of the Rhineland coup.
the diplomatic maneuverings
affair.
22

Italy was the pawn in

•,ecessitated by the Rhineland

.France was eager to maintain cordial relations

Cameron, Prologue, pp. 198, 199.
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with Benito Mussolini and tried to convince Great Britain that League sanctions would only drive him into the
arms of Hitler at a time when the western democracies
needed his support against the German aggressor.
In February, Hitler had attempted to bargain with
Mussolini, urging him to support a German denunciation
of Locarno.

Hitler told the Italian dictator that the

Rhineland occupation would _deflect world attention from
Ethiopia and focus the wrath of the democracies on Germany for a change.

Although Mussolini saw the value in

such a bargain, he was unwilling to denounce Locarno at
that point, as Hitler requested.

He did, however, assure

Hitler·that he would not oppose a German move in the Rhineland.

He also promised Hitler not to support sanctions

against Germany.

During the early days of the remilitar-

ization, Mussolini publicly remained neutral, and vowed
that the Italians would carry out their Locarno obligations faithfully.

But as the crisis wore on French and

British inaction became a fact of life, and Mussolini began to move closer to the side of the Fuhrer and the part23
nership known as the Pact of Steel.

23 Rich, Hitler's War Aims, pu. 88, 89.
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Clearly the policy of drift followed by Great Britain and France in the days immediately following the
Rhineland coup strengthened Hitler's hand and forced the
other nations of Europe to realign and re-evaluate their
policies with regard to Germany.

The Rhineland episode

dealt a death blow to collective security.

No longer

would a united front S'?rve as a deterrent to Nazi aggression.

The.Chancellor of_ the Third Reich had penetrated

its th.in· facade,· and discovered that it was built on
words.alone.
Hitler had survived the period of greatest danger
to his designs, during which he lacked the means of a
military defense, and had to ·rely on a series of judgements that the western· democracies would not act to
stop him.

Hitler's generals had warned him in the most

pressing manner no): to risk a move that was certain to
provoke a French military riposte and could only result
in the humiliation and defeat of the Third Reich.

The

German Chancellor disregarded their caution and when circumstances proved the generals wrong, Hitler became contemptuous of the old-guard conservative leadership and
was increasingly convinced that his judgment was superior
to that of his military experts.
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Hitler's success in the Rhineland is often regarded
as a turning point in the history of the inter-war years,
and it is clear that if Hitler could have been stopped he
should have been stopped in March 1936.

It is difficult

to draw a clear line across any given point of time and
to claim that the errors of human judgment lie on one
side and not the other.

Nevertheless, a close examination

of the reactions of France and Great Britain to the Rhineland crisis indicates that such a line should be drawn.
Both· countries reacted to the crisis with a policy of military and political paltering and prevaricating, a gross
paralysis of will, qnd•incredible errors
and judgment.

of assessment

The Rhineland episode set the precedent

for avoiding the small risk, only to confront the larger
risk in the future, a policy that was followed once again
at Munich in 1938.

CHAPTER VI
THE FRENCH RESPONSE
In March of 1936, France, together with her allies, held a considerable military advantage over any
possible aggressor in Europe.

However, her military

preparedness was based on defensive, rather than offensive capabilities, and public opinion was decidedly
pacifist.

At that time French leaders were unwilling to

risk a war that probqbly would not have been fought at
all if they had been unwilling to call Hitler's bluff and
force German troo~s .out of the Rhineland.

It seems in-

credible now that such an obvious choice was rejected
when the stakes for France and Europe were so high.
Hitler's conviction that remilitarization of the
Rhineland would not provoke a military rejoinder from
his western neighbors proved correct.

Both England and

France were aware that Hitler regarded the recovery of
full sovereignty in the Rhineland as a major oolicy objective, and the French government had been warned re•

I

peatedly by its agents in the Rhineland and its attaches
in Berlin and Berne that a German initiative could be
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expected soon.

In fact, as early as 1932, the Ministry

of War had informed the Foreign Ministry of continuing
violations of the Rhineland restrictions.

In reaction to

these violations, the French General Staff drew up a
retaliatory "Plan D," which provided for a French occupation of the Saar region and a further penetration into
the Rhineland to a line from Trier on the Moselle River
through Kai:serslautern and Landau to the Rhine.I
There is no evidence to suggest that anyone seriously
considered putting "Plan D" into operation on 7 March.
Instead, it appears that in the months directly preceding
the coup, the French government was either unwilling or
unable to formulate a policy to deal with the impending
crisis.

They were definitely fqrewarned, but certainly

not forearmed.

The first intelligence reports concerning

Germany's intentions to actually remilitarize the Rhineland were made in October 1935.

The French Consul Gen-

eral in Cologne, Jean Dobler, sent a report which apparently reached the Vice President of the Supreme War Council,
General Maurice Gamelin, who was also the Commander in

1

Taylor, Munich, p. 128.
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Chief of the French Army.

Gamelin's memoirs indicate

that on 31 October, 1935, the day Dobler filed his report, he (Gamelin) wrote to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs:

"The possibility of a repudiation of the Rhineland

statute should be contemplated before Autumn of 1936 at
the latest. " 2

This proves that the French military lead-

ership was certainly aware of the imminent danger to the
demilitarized zone.
Dobler reported to his superiors in Paris the secret
construction of barracks, the use of Rhineland airfields
by military aircraft, and the establishment of an
regional headquarters in Cologne.

army

Over the next year,

Dobler was the source of a steady stream of intelligence
reports confirming clandestine preparations for the reoccupation of the demilitarized zone.

He reported that the

local police for"ces were being augmented and militarized,
and that stocks of munitions were being accumulated in
the old Cologne forts.

In addition, ground and training

crews had arrived at the airfields and army camps, and
maneuver areas were being established thir"oughout the countryside.

Dobler supplemented these physical observations

with reports of speeches by ranking Nazis, including Dr.

2

Goldman, "Crisis in the Rhineland," p. 51, citing
Genen1l Gamelin, Servir, Volume II (Paris, 1951), p.

195.
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Goebbels, and talks with local officials, on the basis
of which he predicted open remilitarization in the spring
of 1936.

Confirmatory on-the-spot reports also reached

Paris from the Consul General in Dusseldorf. 3
In testimony before the Parliamentary Committee of
Inquiry after the war, Dobler charged that this information never reached the responsible authorities in Paris.
Either the Foreign Minister had been too busy to read the
dispatches or foreign service personnel had been unable
or unwilling to give them directly to him.

He believed

that this was the initial cause of the French failure to
act against Germany both nrior to and during the Rhine. . 4
Although his reports went unacknowledged,
1an d cr1.s1.s.
it is clear that his dispatches were read.

At least by

mid-January 1936, the French pqlitical leaders were well
aware that the Germans might move at any time. 5
Another source of information concerning Germany's
plans was Andre Francois-Poncet, the French Ambassador

3

Taylor, Munich, pp. 128, 129.

4 Goldman, "Crisis in the Rhineland,"
5 Taylor, Munich, p. 130.

pp. 50, 51.
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in Berlin.

He met with Hitler on 21 November 1935, to

advise him that debate was beginning in the French Chamber on ratification of the Franco-Soviet Pact.

The Ger-

man Chancellor reacted by violently denouncing the pact,
charging that it was a military alliance directed against
Germany.

Hitler's reaction convinced Francois-Poncet

that the Germans would retaliate against the pact by
denouncing Locarno and occupying the Rhineland:
In a _long dispatch on 26 November I requested
the government to consult upon what conduct it
should fittingly adopt on the day when Hitler
_passed fro!Jl words to action. Personally I suggested that we should not wait for this to happen; we should forestall it by openly asking the
question, thus.forcing Hitler to lay his cards
on the table. Such a·policy might perhaps persuade Hitler to pledge himself to raise no fortification ·in the Rhine zone in return for our approving the establishment of a few garrisons .
· . . Or else, I urged, let us threaten to oppose
with armed force the realization of his aims.6
Faced with two concrete alternatives suggested by
a man with first hand knowledge of the situation, the
Foreign Ministry decided to accept neither of them.

The

French Foreign Minister told Francois-Poncet that if the
French government appeared to admit any possibility of revising the Locarno Pact the whole agreement might crumble,

6

Francois-Poncet, The Fateful Years,

p.

189.
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with Great Britain and Italy freed of their commitments
in the Rhineland.

The military high command knew of his

November dispatch, Francois-Poncet said, and pressed the
government to tell them what reaction it would have to
a German move in the demilitarized zone.

The answer

was that in such an event the French government would
depend upon the regular procedures of the League of Nations.7
On 25 January, the Sarraut cabinet took office, with
Pierre Flandin as Foreign Minister.

This was barely six

weeks before the Germans made their move, and what little
the French government did in the way

of preparation for

the anticipated blow was done during this short time.

The

Minister of War was General Joseph Maurin, a very defenseminded individual who regaraed the Maginot Line as the
ultimate safeguard against aggression from any quarter. 8
Albert Sarraut was merely heading an interim ministry, maintaining the functions of government until the
spring elections.

He was sixty-four years old, a moderate

who had been in and out of government office for thirty
9
years.
It is important to note that Sarraut commanded
7 Ibid., pp. 189, 190.
8Taylor, Munich, pp. 130, 131.
9 Ibid.
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the allegiance of neither the left nor the right, and was
in many ways, a man without a party.

The fact that Hit-

ler chose March 1936 for his coup indicates that he had a
clear understanding of the French political situation, and
planned to take advantage of the struggles between the
left and right which had weakened the French government
almost to the point of impotency.
Maurin, the Minister of War, had been chosen for
ministerial.office by Flandin, with the approval of Marshal Philippe Petain.

To a 1935 request for a French

armored force, Maurin responded in the French Chamber:
How can anyone believe that we are still
thinking of the offensive when we have
spent so many billions to establish a
fortified frontier'. Should we be mad
enough to advance beyond this barrier
on I don't know what sort of adventure?lO
General Gamelin, regarded by Pertinax as one of the
"Gravediggers of France," shared this viewpoint.

The

General was convinced that the concrete and steel of
the Maginot Line could withstand all manner of assault.
This reliance on the defensive was the credo of the
French military leaders of the 1930's and lies at the

lOibid., p. 131.
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heart of their reluctance to commit the French forces
to military action during the Rhineland crisis. 11
Pierre Flandin is somewhat of an enigma.

An avowed

Anglophile, he cultivated English customs, dress and
friendships, and sought to soften the blow of the Rhineland remilitarization with a revival of the Entente
Cordiale.

Although he appeared to support a forceful

French response to Hitler's coup in the demilitarized
zone, he has been reviled as a "Gravedigger," a German
sympathizer, a fool, and a coward.

He has also been

touted as a farsighted statesman who merely lacked the
. convictions.
. .
12
courage o f h is
These four men, Sarraut, Flandin, Maurin, and
Gamelin shared the burden of formulating French policy
immediately prior to and during the Rhineland couo.
In mid-January 1~36, Gamelin prepared a memorandum
on the growing German military menace.

In it he esti-

mated Germany's effective ground strength at 790,000
l.J,.

Pertinax, The Gravedi ers of France: Gamelin,
Daladier, Reynaud, Petain and Laval Garden City, New
York: Doubleday, Doran & Co., Inc., 1944), po. 11-16.
12

.
Ibid., p. 393; Reynaud, Thick, p. 135.
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men, although the evidence indicates it was more nearly
500,000 at that time.

Approximately 200,000 men made

up the Labor Service (Arbeitdienst), but this groun was
not armed in 1936, nor was it trained to any significant
degree.

His estimate apparently also included 40,000 SS

men, a contingent similarly lacking in military significance.

Three days before he wrote the memorandum, he

had been warned by his intelligence service that the
Rhineland would be reoccupied in "the near future."

He

pointed out in his.memorandum that the loss of the Rhineland would put France's ·eastern allies at the mercy of
Germany, but recommended nothin1s to counter the threat.
His message was considered on 18 Januaryby the Military
High Commission.

The only action taken at the meeting

was an agreement to request additional military apnropri.
13
ations.
Gamelin's memorandum clearly exemplifies the French
dilemna regarding German rearmament and the remilitarizatiort of the Rhineland.

The Government of France was con-

vinced that once Germany remilitarized the Rhineland, the
zone would immediately be fortified and the value of
the Little Entente would be strategically nullifed.

How-

ever, this conviction seems to have been outweighed- by
13
Taylor, Munich, p. 131.

their exaggerated view of German military strength.
The French leadership seemed so terrified of what it
imagined German military strength to be that it was unable to muster the necessary resolve to lay plans for
a counteraction in the event of a German reoccupation
of the zone.

Since the French government was reason-

ably well-informed as to the extent of German rearmament the belief that the Reich exceeded France in trained
' may have been
men and was about to pull ahead in materiel

due to the psychological effect of such para-military
formations as the SA and SS, in spite of the fact that
their miltiary utility was negligible.

It could also

perhaps be attribu.ted to the fear that secret German rearmament was far more extensive than French intelligence
had realized, or perhaps to a need on the part of the
French government. to deceive itself with good excuses
for refraining from action.

It is also conceivable that

the French fear was the result of a combination of all
three.

Whatever the origins of this exaggerated view

of German might, it clearly palsied the will of the Fl'.:ench
government and the French military establishment. 14

lLr

Weinberg, Foreign Policy, pp. 243, 244.
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Pierre Flandin spoke with the British Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden, on 27 January regarding the Rhineland issue.

Flandin told Eden that his government was

concerned about the possibility of German action in the
demilitarized zone,

and asked what advice

Eden would

give concerning the attitude the French government should
adopt.

Eden responded that

he considered :i.t "improba-

ble" that Hitler "would take any precipitate action in
the near future· .." 15

Eden also told Flandin that

the

French governmen:t must decide for itself how much importance it attached to the demilitarized zone, and whether
the French wished to maintain it at all costs or if they
would prefer to bargain with the German government while
the existence of the zone still had some value in German
Eden suggested that if they wished to negotiate

eyes.

with Hitler, they should do so, but if they intended to
repel a German invasion of the zone, they
their military plans.

should lay

Fland.in replied that these were

just -the subjects which he thought

their governments

should carefully consider and on which they should then
consult.

Eden remarked in his memoirs

that "This was

hardly the attitude or language of a man determined to
fight for the Rhineland." l6

15 Eden, Facing, p. 373.
16 Ibid.
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The Supreme Military Committee met in early February with Flandin presiding.

The French Foreign Min-

ister described the recent influx of intelligence information regarding the zone, and asked what measures
could be taken if the Germans reoccunied the Rhineland.
Maurin informed him that the French Armv had been organized solely to conduct a defensive camnaign, and had
made no prenarations for offensive action, and was not
ready for any type of military intervention. 17
During the course of the meeting Gamelin, the Minister of the Navy and the Air Minister all expressed
similar views.

When Flaridin voiced his astonishment at

their position, General Gamelin told him that the General Staff was an executive organ, and th~t it was the
government's responsibility to make the necessary decision.

The military would then carry out the orders of
the government. 13
This canitulation on the nart of the Chief of Staff

appears to be characteristic of the reluctance on the
nart of French government officials to shoulder resoonsi-

17

Goldman,· "Crisis in the Rhineland," PP .. 57, 58,
citing Flandin's.memoirs, Politique Francaise, P. 195.
'

18
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bility and make decisions. ·The military refused to sug-

)

gest a course of action, instead insisting that anv resistance, short of a general mobilization, would be ineffective.

Sarraut, who apoarently favored a forceful

response, hesitated to make anv kind of commitment so
19
close to Che general elections.
There is no evidence to indicate that between Flarldin's conversation with Eden on 27 January and the ratification of the Franco-Soviet Pact a month later that
the French-government was able to formulate a policy to
deal with what had now become a certainty - A German
reoccupation of the Rhineland.

On 14 February, the

British Ambassador asked Pierre F'landin for a soecific
s.tatement of French policy regarding the Rhineland.

The

French Foreign Minister evaded the question, indicating
that he would contact Anthony Eden regarding the matter.
The Ambassador also approached Gamelin on the same subject, but on~e again was refused an answer. 20
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Finally on 2.7 February, the day the treaty with
Russia was ratified, the French cabinet met to consider for the first time what action should be taken
when the Germans made the expected move.

No record

of the proceedings has survived, except for postwar
testimony and the memoirs of Gamelin.

The official

formulation of France's Position,
which was given
in
.
.
confidence to the Belgian-_Ambassador that same day
and to Anthony Eden on March 3 was as follows:
The French government will not take any isolated
action. It will act.only- in accord with the
cosignatories of Locarno.
In case of a flap.:rant and incontestable violation (of the Rhineland Provisions)-the
.
. French
government will immediately consult with the
British, Belgian and Italian governments with
a view to taking common action in execution
of the League of Nations pact and the Locarno
ag;reements.
While awaiting the opinion of ·-the guarantor
powers, the French government reserves the
right to take all measures, including those
of a military character, preparatory to such
collective action as mav be decided uPon by
the Council of the 1Iague of Nations and the
Locarno guarantors.

21
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This

statement amounts to little more than pro-

crastination.

It did not take into account the fact

that French Allies might be unwilling to act, and did
not deal with the possibility of unilateral action by
France if her Allies did not rally to her aid.
On_ the morning of March 7, the long awaited blow
came.

Premier Sarraut immediately called an informal

meeting to attempt to establish one policy or solution
out of the discussions of the past weeks.

Present at

'

the meeting were Fla-q,din, Maurin, Joseph Paul-Boncour,
who was France's· represen_tative'to the League of Nations,
General Gamelin,-.and George S. Mandel, the Minister of
Post and Telegraph.

Mandel and Paul-Boricour urged Sar-

raut to issue a formal demand to the Germans that they
withdraw.

If they refused, the military would then force

them to do so.

Sarraut asked·· Gamelin whether F.rance could

accomplish this if she were not assisted by her allies. ·
Gamelin replied that under current conditions France was
strong enough to do so, but a war of long duration would
favor Germany because of her superior numbers and indus.
22
trial capacity.
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That evening, a similar meeting was held, and it
was decided that the Council of the League of Nations
should be formally notified of Germany's breach of treaty and that the Locarno powers, other than Germany, should
be called to emergency session.

Similar meetings con-

tinued on the eighth, with Flandin, Sarraut, Mandel and
Paul-Boncour continuing to favor immediate military
action.

However, the military ministers
urged
caution,
.
.
.
~

and Sarraut did not attempt ·to impose his will upon the
cabinet. 23
The French government,tmmediately received notes of
support from Poland, Czech~·slovakia, the .Soviet Union,
Rumania, Hungary and Yugoslavia•.. All t~ese nations in-

,·

dicated their willingness to support France-. in the military response to which she ..was by treaty.~ntitled, but
the French held to their decision to appeal to the League
of Nations.

The British Foreign Office, which had made an

urgent plea to Flandin to be "prudent, coolheaded and
24
conciliatory," supported the French decision.
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Eden informed Flandin that he had warned the German
ambassador that the British government took an extremely
serious view of the situation.

He added that if the

French would bring the matter before the League of Nations,
as provided by the Locarno Treaty in the case of a nonflagrant violation, the British government would support
the French case.

Since it had become an axiom of French

foreign policy that France would not move against Germany
without the cooperation of the Locarno signatories, it is
not surprising that Eden's promise kept Flandin from pressing for military action.

To the Eastern European nations

who had offered support, this was tantamount to abandonment.

Eduard Bene~ wrote in his memoirs.a particularly

apt summary of the situation:
On March 7, 1936, Hi~ler, in reoccupying the
Rhineland, dealt a decisive blow at the cause
of European peace. Czecho~lovakia - and probably Poland also - was_-r~ady, to march· by the side
of France against Germany.
had told the French
Minister in.Prague that we should support France
if she decided to reject the consequences which
were imposed upon her by Hitler's attitude. The
latter had broken the Treaty of Locarno and the
Rhineland Pact and, because of this Pact, authorized France and Britain to go immediately to war.
The Western democracies would have been able to
stop Germany, whilst there was still time, in the
pursuit of this criminal war.
In my opinion, we
were obliged to march at the side of these two
Powers and we would have done so.
But nothing
happened.
France thus committed the most dangerous of errors . . . . France did not act, when
she had the right to do so in accordance with
the terms of a· treaty signed by Germany and.
concluded to provide for this particular case.

We
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The Western democracies gave evidence of indecision, of weakness.
and with a lack of foresight which bordered on frivolity. This important
fact was the cause of the tragic collapse of France.
It was the first chapter-in the story of Munich and
of the surrender of June, 19lf0. In March, 1936,
France abandoned herself to her fate; it was thus
the easier for her to abandon us to ours in September, 1938.25
·
In choosing League action, France was taking the
line of least resistance.
a military response.

·Both the left and right opposed

The French right charged that the

French government had provoked Hitler. into·. the remilitar-

.'

.

ization of the Rhineland by_ratification of the
Soviet Pact.

Franco-

While the French 'left did not defend Hit-

ler, it announced 'that it ._was madness ~o be~ieve that Germany should continue· to endure tjl,e restriction of Versailles seventeen_ years after. the cessation of hostilities.

Both groups based their statements.to the over-

riding conviction that there should be "above all, no
war'. 1126

In spite of the fact that.public opinion did
;-

not favor military resistance·, the-solution ultimately
lay in the hands of the French government, and the ministers had a difficult decision to make. The alternatives
were to accept the breach as non-flagrant and await League
action, or to view the coup as a flagrant violation and

25 Eduard Benes, quoted in Reynaud, In the Thick of
the Fight, p. 125.
26 Ibid., p. 127.
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a cause for war.

Hitler had carefully limited his troops

and equipment in the Rhineland so as to avoid giving the
impression that the move was a forerunner to invasion of
either France or Belgium.

The Chancellor's decision to

employ moderation may also have been partially based on
the idea that a French response would have been limited,
if it were made at all.

If, on the other hand, the French

Army mounted a major offen'~'ive· to throw a few thousand
troops out of the Rhinela!1l, ;it risked cormni ti:ing a major
I

'

•

psychological error similar' to the Ruhr in•cursion, giving
the world "the hateful spec table of war

mo.ngering. 1127

I

In spite of some talk about using "a hammer to kill
a fly, 1128 Flandin was appareritly convinced by Gamelin and
others in the War Ministry that not only did France lack an
adequate striking force, but that she also Ia.eked the wherewithal to sustain a lengthy 'assault.
-

'

The evidence though,

indicates that the French military was adequately manned
and well enbugh equipped to have answered the challenge
and indeed to have driven the Germans out of the Rhineland.29

But it has also been suggested that the French

Army of 1936 had no strike force capable of marching as
27 Eden, Facing, p. 367.
28 Taylor ,· Munich, p. 136.
29 This view is shared by Taylor, Rich, Shirer, Weinberg, and Goldm~n.
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far as Mainz, or of occupying the entire demilitarized
zone, and that it did not poss'ess a single unit which could
be made instantly combat ready. 3 0
The consensus of evidence indicates that France did
have adequate military resources to answer the Rhineland
coup with force, even had she been forced to act unilaterally.

Such a move, however,·would have required a

courageous and imaginative, as well as determir1ed, military leadership.

This Fran·ce did r,ot possess.

The Gen-

eral Staff, by clinging to t;he belief that ~ts defensive
concept was infallible, did much t~ underm~ne the French
will to resist a Rhineland OC!=!upation.

Any ' army is only

I

as good as its leadership; and if the leade;rship refuses
to lead, the cause is lost.

Therefore the.question of

whether France alone had t~e military capacity to reply
forcefully is a moot point, since
she obviously did not
.'
have the will to do so, but it is clear that German
strength was not nearly as great as was widely presumed.
The French General Staff consistently overrated
Hitler's military strength.

As early as 1934, fears were

being expressed in Paris that the illegal Reich forces
had surpassed the French Army numerically and that Germany's war industries would soon be superior to those of
30
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France.

During the last half of 1935, the question most

often pondered by French military experts was not whether
Germany could defend herself, but how soon Hitler could
successfully launch an offensive.

These alarms may have

been voiced initially to arouse the French public to the
need for greater rearmament, but there is no doubt that
by 1936 the French Army high command had become convinced
that Germany was an armed camp.

Overestimates of German

strength continued during the reoccupation, when General
Gamelin numbered the troops in the Rhineland at 250,000,
.
. b er. 31
roug hl y ten times
t h..
eir actua 1 num
Flandin also had to consider future relations with
Great Britain.

Even thoug_h he favored military action, he

believed that to force Britain to march against her will
by initiating hostilities against the Reich would have a
grave effect on Anglo-French relations.

Once their ob-

ligation had been fulfilled, Flandin believed the British
would repudiate other commitments to France and either retire into isolation or negotiate directly with Germany.
Nothing, he believed, could be worse for France than
the collapse or even the weakening of Franco-British unity in the face of the German menace.

31
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At Flandin's request, delegations from Great Britain, Belgium and Italy met on 10 March at the Ouai
d'Orsay in Paris.

The talks opened with the French For-

eign Minister attempting to put his colleagues at ease
by stating at the outset that he did not expect any
resolution to be made at the meeting.

Instead he urged

them to discuss the Rhineland situation and arrive at a
"common position" which could be taken when'the Council
of the League of Nation 9_ met.

A flagrant violation had

occurred, he stated, and France had an incontestable
right to act in order to force a German evacuation of
the illegally occupied zone.
'

.

France would,· however, res-

pect th_e desire of Great Britain that she follow proper
procedure and bring the question before the Council of
the League of Nations.

Flandin stated his assumption

that the League Council would _endor-se any action which
the Locarno powers decided to undertake.3 3
At that point the formal cordiality of the meeting was
destroyed by the emergenc·e of a basic disagreement between
France and Great Britain.

Anthony Eden pointed out that

33
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·the other League members were under no obligation to
support France or the Locarno powers.

If Flandin assumed

that France would get automatic support from the League
members, Eden added, there could be great difficulty in
store at the League Council meetings. 34
Flandin proceeded to outline the procedure which he
believed the Locarno powers shoul_d follow.
'

First, he
'

said, an ultimatum should be ·sent to Germany, demanding
0

an immediate withdrawal fr,om the zqne.

Second, no neg-

otiations should be held as long _as Gerinany retained military forces there.

Finally,. if Hitler refused to with-

draw, the Locarno signatories 'would demand sanctions and
start by removing their ambassadors from.Berlin as agesture of discontent.

The s·anctions would be applied in

successive stages, beginni~g with economic measures but
resorting to military ones if the former were ineffective.
Flandin then announced, in front of the Italian Ambassador, that sanctions against Italy should be lifted if
she would now support France.
the Anglo-French breach.

This statement widened

Eden viewed this as a cynical

action amounting to rewarding one aggressor if he would
help deal with a more powerful one. 35

34Ibid., p. 243.
35 Ibid., pp. 24Lf-245.
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Eden then announced that France should "not undertake anything against Germany which would create an irreparable situation."

He assured Flandin that the Bri-

tish government had no intention of evading its obligations, but declared that the problem could certainly be
settled by diplomatic means, and that his country would
36
be glad to take charge of these.
Flandin
standing

and his couhtrvmen had difficulty underJ

-

•

how the guarantor of a treaty co"uld be the

mediator in a dispute involving a breach
treaty.

• •

of that same

Yet it was _clear from the·outset that this

neutral role had been taken· on ·by Great· Britain and
would be accepted by the French. 37
The talks in Paris really accomplished
except to expose

little

the Anglo-French antagonism which

had been latent for some time·.

Before adjournment,

it was agreed that further talks should be held in
London, where the League

Council meetings were sche-

duled to take place.3 8

36 Eden, Facing, p. 393.
37 Goldman, "Crisis in the Rhineland," p. 245.
38 rbid.
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The Locarno powers met again in London on 12 March,
and here
gence.

Flandin was confronted with British intransiHe implored the British statesmen and politi-

cians to adhere

to a strict interpretation of the Lo-

carno Treaty, to support France military action became
necessary and to lead Europe in a crusade against Nazi
aggression.

The Locarno powers, including Italy, mere-

ly agreed that they would .pernit. the.Council of the
League of Nations to .dec:1-de·, whE;ther or not, Germany had
.

'

violated the Locarno Treij.ty _.
don between 14 and 17 March.
.

'

.

!

The Council·. met in LonHitler sent v9n Ribben-

trop as his perilonal repr_e'senta.tive·.

The Council de-

clared Germany guilty of a breach of her obligations
under Locarno, but Neville Chamberlain and Stanley
Baldwin convinced Flandin that the only course left
was for France to negotiate with the Germans.

This

merely reinforced French policy, which had already
become one of trying to save face with vociferous demands for action which were carefully calculated to
cover retreat.

On the nineteenth, the Locarno powers

submitted to von Ribbentrop a set of pro~osals aimed
at achieving detente between France and Germany.
proposals asked if the Germans would submit their

The
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doubts about the Franco-Soviet Pact to the Hague Court,
and whether they would limit their forces and refrain
from making fortifications in the Rhineland pending negotiations over Germany's counter proposals. 39
With the submission of these proposals the French
initiative was lost.

She had surrendered her right to

military action and passed her leadership to Great Britain.

The fate of the Rhineland was sealed.·· Hitler

could take his time in ~pswering the questions and in
submitting counter proposals·.

No French guns were

aimed at Saarbrucken and n9 .F~ench soldiers were preparing to cross the Maginot Line.·
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CHAPTER VII
EARLY BRITISH RESPONSE
When Her Majesty's Government are considering
whether or not there is a basis of negotiation,
I should like to suggest to my noble friend a
test which they might apply: It is whether the
agreement for which they are working will serve
only to relax tension for a while, or whether it
is in the true in.terests' of lasting peace. We
must not perpetrate an injustice in order to get
a little present ease; and.the Government qa~e
(sic)to consider whether their decision gives
peace, not just for an ·hour or a day or two, but
in their children's time, That is the difference
between appeasement and-peace.1 Lord Avon, Anthony Eden, 1961
Perhaps that is the lesson tqe Rhineland crisis
taught, but in studying that episode, one is forced to
the conclusion that in 1936, appeasement was the order
of the day.

While the French government preferred

to think of Locarno and the Rhineland guarantees as
non-negotiable, and therefore chose to put the whole
issue aside andaNait the inevitable, it appears that
only in retrospect did the British government reach
the conclusion that the demilitarized zone was critical to the peace of Europe.

Great Britain regarded

the Rhineland as a valuable bargaining counter, one
1 Eden, Facing, p. viii.
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which could be used to appease Hitler's appetite
for aggrandizement while at the same time securing
for Great Britain an air pact with Germany.

Neither

the French policy (or non-policy) nor the British
took into consideration "the whim of a mad dictator"
until it was too late.

Hitler's sudden move left the

two western democracies without a coherent policy,
and neither was sufficiently prepared, on the spur
of the moment, to formulate one.
The key to understanding the position taken by the
British government during the Rhineland crisis lies in
an examination of several political and diplomatic
developments which had just t'aken place.

First, the

British government had only recently changed hands.
The elections held in the fal:(. of 1935 saw

the

victory

of Stanley Baldwin, whose program was based on a ueace
platform.

Baldwin chose Anthony Eden to succeed Sir

Samuel Hoare as Foreign Minister.

These two men, along

with Neville Chamberlain, the champion appeaser, were
largely responsible for the formulation of British
policy during the remilitarization episode.

Domesti-

cally, the Baldwin government was caught between attempting to rearm, but without placing a strain ,in in<lus try,
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and shoring up Britain's offensive and defensive capabiliti.es in the face of a pacifist public opinion.
Second, the issue of Italian sanctions, Anglo-French
relations and the German revisionist plans combined
to make a quagmire of British foreign policy.

The is-

sue of Mussolini's aggression in Ethiopia loomed large,
and Great Britain, still smarting from the Hoare-Laval
fiasco, favored sanctions.
..

of
·. F'rance, . fearful
.
.
. .. aliena'

.

'

ting Mussolini, did not, Pierre Flandin was anxious to
enhance Franco-British unity ·and offered to'support sanctions in return for a Brit'ish agreement' re.garding the
Rhineland.

This offer was just. on·e of several attempts

made by the French .,to secure a pledge from Great Britain
concerning the sanctity of 1 the demilitarized zone.

The

British government steadfa.stly refused to accede to such
a trade-off, and furthermore shpnned any statements regarding the demilitarized zone.

From January 1935

through pre-coup 1936, the British government resisted
all French efforts to secure pledges or other statements
on behalf of the demilitarized zone.

Great Britain chose

only to reaffirm in general her fidelity to Locarno.

2

.

2
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The British government during this time practiced
a double-edged policy with regard to Germany. Its ministers avoided anything resembling a direct warning regarding the demilitarized zone.

In the face of Hitler's

growing power and potential for mischief making the British wanted to avoid any statement which would definitely commit them to some kind of military action or force
them to climb down from some untenable position.

But

at the same time, they preferred Hitler to think that
the British government regar,ded the Rhineland· statutes
as inviolable. 3
The Baldwin government was attempting to secure
public approval for rearmament, an issue which placed
the British government on· the horns of a dilemna.

For

the last fifteen years, British official policy had been
to support the League of Nations and disarmament, under
the mantle of collective security.

While the French

appear to have totally embraced this illusive doctrine
and allowed its ideology to paralyze their will, the
British took a more practical stance.

The British gov-

ernment apparently realized that the Ethiopian crisis
and German rearmament were seriously undermining collective security, and although the French seemed con3

Emmerson, The Rhineland Crisis, p. 60.
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strained to bury their heads in the sand, the English
decided to rearm themselves as a counter to this threat.
In 1935,

the Defense Policy and Requirements Committee

was established.

Baldwin presided over

the corrnnittee,

whose members included the Lord President, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the Foreign Secretary,
three service ministers.

and the

It has been suggested that no

single document goes so far to explain British foreign
policy during the Ethiopian and Rhineland affairs than
this committee's report, which was written under presure of Germany's expansion of her air force.

The re-

port warned that:
It is of the utmost imp'ortarice that this country
should not become involved in war within the next
. that
few years. We cannot urge too strqngly.
risk
no opportunity shoul1 be lost to avoid the
of war . . . as long as p~ssible.4
The possibility of hostile action by Italy in response to League sanctions combined with fears of extensive German rearmament to convince the British leadership
that it must quicken the pace of its own rearmament program.

A report from the Air Ministry indicated that by

fall of 1935, the Germans would have fifty squadrons,
comprising 600 aircraft, ready for use. That same year,
Winston Churchill made a comparison of British and German air strength and concluded

4 Taylor, Munich, p. 227.

that the government's

116
promise to maintain air parity was not being fulfilled
and that Britain was entering a time of "perilous weakness."5
During the late 1930's rearmament in Great Britain
was hampered by a stringent peace-time budget and quarreling often arose among the military ministers over who
would get what.

Fear of aerial bombardment and faith in

strategic bombing had led Stanley Baldwin to ·declare in
'

'

the House of Commons as early as 1932 that·· 11,the bomber
,·,6
will always get through . .
This faith· in air power
and fear of aerial attack determined the course British
rearmament would take, and fed Baldwin to seek increased
spending for defense.
The Defense Requirements Committee issued a series
of reports in late 1935 estimating that Germany would not
attain her intended naval strength until 191+2, that her
army would closely approach the size of the French by 1939
and considerably exceed it by 1945, and that the German
Air Force would be formidable by 1938.

The committee

concluded that it was "unlikely" that the Germans would
launch an aggression before 1942, but that the British
should reach a reasonable state of preparedness by 1931. 7
5
Ibid., p. 234.
6will Fowler, ed., Strate y & Tactics of Air Warfare
(New Jersey: Chartwell Books, Inc., 1979 , p. 13.
7
Taylor, Munich, p. 235.
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In order to achieve this, Baldwin and his ministers
sought to enter into negotiations with Germany so that
their opposition in Parliament could not charge them with
rearming precipitately.
clear the air.

An attempt to negotiate would

Either Hitler would comply or he would

refuse, in which case the British people would have a
better view of the danger posed by Adolph Hitler.

At

,.

the time, Hitler made fre~uent protestations of his
peaceful intentions, and·dec~ied his total deyotion to
Locarno and the demilitarized zone.

Many Britons be-

lieved that any agreement s~gned by Hitler would be
worthless, but others ·beli~ved t;:hat even if he signed an
agreement and later repudiated his signature, Britain
would have at least gained some time for her rearmament
efforts, which were thought to require at minimum a three
year effort. 8
This policy has been regarded as foolhardy and cir.cui tous by many and Baldwin is often criticized for his
attempt to lure support for rearmament in this manner.
It has been suggested that the Prime -Minister could have
been elected on a program of limited

rearmament in 1935

had he enlightened the British people to the potential

8
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dangers of Adolph Hitler and German rearmament, a situation amply proven by British intelligence reports. 9 Such
a policy would certainly have made the British response
to remilitarization of the Rhineland much simpler.
The British government was operating on th_e premise
that France lacked the military and moral strength to
respond forcefully to German aggression.

At the same

time, Eden and others suspected that the·French might
seek to excuse themselves for not·fighting cin'the grounds
that the British would not jo'in them.

Nev'ertheless the

possibility could not be entiFely ruled .-out· that the
Sarraut ministry might react foi::cefully tq
haps even·ty mobilizing.

a

coup, per-

If -that occuri::ed, Britain would

be morally, if not legally, bound to support.France in
punitive measures against Germiny,

This possibility,

coupled with the increasing l:i,kelihood of a fait accompli
in the zone, prompted Eden to a'dvise the cabinet against
adopting any attitude which might oblige the government
to either fight for the zone or abandon it in the face
.
10
o f a German reoccupation.

9winterbotham, Nazi Connection, pp. 126, 127.
lOEmmerson, Rhineland Crisis, p. 61.
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In early 1936, at the suggestion of the British
cabinet and under the direction of Anthony Eden, the
Foreign Office conducted a study of Locarno, the Rhineland statutes, the strategic significance of the zone,
and its impact on the issue of British rearmament.
officials first studied and evaluated

The

the positions of

the Soviet Union, Belgium and Italy with regard to the
maintenance of the demilitarized zone.

Cognizant of the

;

fact that Russia was committed by the Franco-Soviet Pact
only in the event of a direct attack on France, they
reached the conclusion tha·t· the most Russia was likely
to offer in the event of a German reoccupation was advice.

Belgium, on the other hand was a Locarno signa-

tory and vitally interested in maintaining the demilitarized zone because it bordered on her own frontiers
as well as those of France.

Since Belgium was not a

party to the Franco-Soviet Pact, if the Cermans used that
as a pretext to reoccupy the zone, the Belgian government would have a legitimate grievance and could apoeal
to the League Council.

The ministers also speculated

that Belgium would follow the French lead in any reaction to a breach of treaty, in.s])i te of the fact that the
Belgians, like the English, did not believe the zone
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could be preserved indefinitely.

As a guarantor of Lo-

carno, Italy had the same obligations as Great Britain,
but there was very little expectation that the Italian
government would honor them.

The heavy drain on Italian

resources, the international animosities engendered by
the Abyssinian conflict, and the imposition of League
sanctions all precluded Italian cooperation with the
other Locarno powers in any actiop aga_inst GerJ11any, who
had not joined in the sanction's f1.~ainst Italy .. Italian
inaction would repay this favor,,while a crisis in the
Rhineland would benefit Italy by diverting·world attention
.

-

from the Ethiopian _situation .. As matters s:ood, the British government concluded that Italy would be most likely to do nothing in the event of a German remilitarization
of the Rhineland.11
In addition to estimati_ng the probable reactions of
the Soviet Union and the Locarno signatories, the Foreign
Office also assessed the military, political and diplomatic repercussions of a remilitarization of the Rhine-

11 Lawrence Warner Hill, "British Official Reaction
to the Rhineland Crisis, November 1935-May 1936," Ph.D.
dissertation, Texas Christian University,· 1972, University Microfilms1, Ann Arbor, Mich ..' 1972, ?P- 74, 75.
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land.

In early January 1936, Foreign Office leaders

requested that a military evaluation be made by the
appropriate departments.

Anthony Eden raised two spec-

ific questions before the Committee of Imperial Defense:
(1)

Of what defensive value would the demilitarized

zone be to France, Belgium and Great Britain; and (2)
Did the zone constitute any obstacle to the defense of
Germany against an attack b'y the" we_stern P,?wers?

On

2 7 January, in response tci Eden's inquirie_s
·, the Sec..
retaries of State for Air and ~ar·forwarded;reports to
the Foreign Office.

Their conclusions were that the

Rhineland zone was of ~egligifile _defensive value to the
western powers and constitu_ted no obstacle to the defense of Germany in the event of an air attack.

They

reported that modern aircraft range capabiTities eliminated the necessity for Germ.any "to establish permanent
air bases there.

On the other-hand, if a land attack

was launched against the Reich, the Germans possibly
would have to divert aircraft from other areas to defend the frontier.

This would weaken the air defense

of Germany as a whole.

In addition, if the zone re-

mained demi).itarized, German anti-aircraft _equipment
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would have to be positioned further back from the frontier, which would allow attacking forces some tactical
12
advantages.
This report, coupled with the Foreign Office assessments of the zone's almo~t negligible political value led
the British Government to conclude that the Rhineland
demilitarized zone had one significant value - as a basis
for negotiation.

What _emerged· from ,the study was a Bri-

tish policy plan which favored negotiation and peaceful
remilitarization of the Rhi'neland.
tate a revision of Locarno.

This would·necessi-

In return for,. remili.tariza-

tion, Great Britain wanted an.air pact and:some guarantee of the security of Cent,ra-1 and Eastern European allies of France, who wouldibe adversely affected by remil.
.
.
13
itarization.

12 Ibid., pp. 67-75. Hill uses·material from the
British Public Record Office in London. The documents
concerning the Rhineland affair remained closed until
1968, when the British government repealed the old 50
year rule, and this opened them for use. In this section he cites "Secret" C.I.D. papers, Air Ministry pa"[)ers,
and minutes of the Foreign Office from the month of January, 1936.
13
Ibid., pp. 74, 75.
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This policy plan, although practical in some ways,
ignored the significance of the Rhineland for the rearmament of Germany.

If the British wanted only time to re-

arm and prepare, was it not foolhardy to return the
Rhineland to total German control?

Demilitarization meant

that there was to be no manufacture of armaments or munitions in the zone.

Krupp and I. G. Farben had been spec-

ifically prohibited from ma:nufactm;ing weaponry, and many
of the Krupp works had literally been obliged to beat
their swords into plow shar·eJ.

However, this treaty im-

posed hiatus actually worked to the advantage of the Reich,
because Krupp entered the, cru·c:i.al ·1930' s with modern facilities and techniques.

The restoration of German sover-

eignty in the Rhineland would mean the end of limitations
on the manufacture of weaponry·, and the "Arm_orers of the
Reich" could begin to produce openly and in unlimited
quantity what they had been turnin•g ·out secretly for at
14
least three years.
The British policy pian also failed to take into
account the psychological value of the demilitarized zone.
It remained to the Germans the last remnant of the Ver-

14william Manchester, The Arms of Krupp 1587-1968
(Boston and Toronto: Little, Brown and Comoany, l§bli1,
p. 324.
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sailles diktat and if it could be regained by the Fuhrer
so easily, what might the western democracies accede to
in the future?

Conversely, abandonment of the demilitar-

ized zone would mean the end of collective security and
the vittual desertion of Central and Eastern Europe by
the western democracies, a capitulation which would cast
them in the role of craven cowards in the eyes of the
15
world.
A major consideration··a:d_dressed by '·the Foreign Office was how to handle French recalcitrance.,

It was

agreed
that the British would attempt
to convince France
.
.
that public opinion in neither country would, support military action, and that neither country was prepared for
war with Germany.

If this.failed, they could then insist

that the Rhineland problem had assumed the character of a
Franco-German dispute which ·:should be handled by the arbitration procedures set forth in the Covenant of the
League of"Nations.16

15

Goidman, "Crisis in the Rhineland," p. lfl8.

16 ttill, "British Official Reaction," p. 75.
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Clearly, British prospects for success in negotiating a settlement with Germany appeared bleak, but in the
opinion of Anthony Eden and other Foreign Office officials,
Europe stood at the crossroads and the only hope for European peace and stability lay in curbing Germany. This,
they believed, was impossible until Britain and France
were in a stronger military position.

The British be-

lieved they could buy the -.t:i,me
.-needed for rearmament and
'
.
simultaneously
secure ,a be.tter
• agreement
than
Locarno by
.
' ,, ' ,
.
.
'
sacrificing the demil{ tari'zed. zone.'. ,The, Foreign Office
determined, therefore, that an attempt should be made to
forestall an impending crisis oyer_ the' Rhineland in order
to prevent a greater catastroph~. 17
'

Eden reported his conclusions and those of the Foreign Office to the British Cabinet o_n february 14:
Taking one thing with another, it seems, · undesirable to adopt an attitude where we would
either have to.fight for the zone or abandon
it in the face of German reoccupation. It would
be preferable for Great Britain.and France to
enter betimes into negotiations with the German
Government for the surrender on conditions of our
rights in the zont while such surrender still has
bargaining value. 8

17

Ibid., p. 77.

18 Eden, Facing, P~- 375, 376.
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The Foreign Office had concluded that to wait and
merely react to Hitler's initiatives was to court disaster, yet that is exactly what the British government
did.

The Cabinet was deeply involved in consideration

of a forthcoming "British White Paper" on rearmament
and in the establishment of a new ministry for the coordination of imperial defense.

Consequently, with apparent

indifference to the urgency o{ ith"~ Rhinel;and situation,
the Cabinet took no immediate a'.ction on .Eden's recommendations other than to refer ,h_is · sugges·tioris' to the
Cabinet Committee on German~. '£qr fu~ther study . 19
During the days following the 27 February ratification of the Franco-Soviet Pact, a series. of developments
occurred which unders.cored the differences between French
and English attitudes toward .the zone. ··The ·British were
intent upon negotiating some ··,air and arms agreements with
•'

Germany using the zone as a bargaining point, in soite of
the fact that the Rhineland was not theirs to p,:ive away.
They had decided to approach the Germans, secure a working
agreement with them, and then submit the oroposals to the
French as the very best of a bad deal.

But Eden ercountere<l

Pierre Flandin at a meeting of the League Council in Geneva

19 Hill, "British Official Reaction," p. 77
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on 3 March.

The Frenchman asked for specific assurances

that England would assist his country in upholding the
Rhineland statutes.
dilemna for Eden.

This created an extremely awkward
He could hardly promise to support

Articles 42 and 43 when the British policy makers had
just dismissed them as non-vital.

Nor ·could he admit that

his government was preparing to negotiate the articles out
of existence.

Neither·: collld be refuse

to reaffirm Great

Britain's existing commitments re~arding th~ demilitarized
zone without expecting his 6ouhtry to l;>e:censured in France
: '
.
for taking a selective attitude toward her treaty obligations.

This would almost ce:r:tainly have provoked the

French government into.retaliating.by,-refusing to impose
oil sanctions against Mussolini on the grounds that French
security required a strong ~hd friendly Italian ally. 20
Eden evaded the issue.

Flan.din· told the Foreign Secre-

tary that the French government had made a decision as
to what action it would take in the event of a German
reoccupation of the demilitarized zone.

He also told him

that in the event of a flagrant breach of treaty by Germany, France would instantly inform the League Council
and consult Great Britain, Belgium and Italy in order to

20

Emmerson, Crisis in the Rhineland, p. 69.
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determine a concerted course of action.

France reserved

the right to take any preparatory measures, including
military ones, in anticipation of collective action by
the League and the guarantors of Locarno.

The French

plan was set forth in a memorandum which Flandin subsequently sent to Eden. 21 Eden confined himself to the
reply that he would report :·the ·French Government's position to the cabinet, and -then adivse his counterpart
of their response.

He never-did so. 22

The League was meeting i~ Geneva to discuss the im,

position of oil sanctions-against ·Mussolini.

At the sui:t-

gestion of Flandin, the Council agreed to postpone action
until 10 March.

This proved to be fatal, because by 10

March the ·Abyssinian crisis had been relegated to a very
minor issue due to the actions of Adolph Hitler on the
seventh.23

21
Eden, Facing, p. 378. (see page 98)
22

Reynaud, In the Thick, p. 122

23Eden, Facing, p. 379.
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The British interpreted the French memorandum .to mean
that they were not planning to take immediate action in
the event of a German reoccunation, but were counting on
Great Britain's support to maintain the demilitarized
zone.

They then concluded that they must negotiate with

the Germans on the subject of the zone while such action
was still possible.
Anthony Eden detailed the' ·urgency of t}-te situation
in his memoirs:
There was not one man in a thousand in the country
at that time prenared to take physical·action with
France against a German reoccunation of the Rhineland. Many went further than this .and thought it
unreasonable that Germany should not·be allowed to
do as she wished in her own territory, nearly twenty
years after the end of the war. These opinions were
represented among my colleagues, but I knew that I
must rebuild the Anglo-French alliance for the sake
of both our countries and.that the Locarno Treaty
must be kept alive, as the most effective deterrent
to Hitler in the future.24'
To achieve this, Eden suggested that his government
take the initiative toward the German government and begin
a discussion of an air pact.

On 6 March, Eden saw the

German Ambassador and asked him to "refer to the Chancellor the possibility of the opening of serious discussions
on the Air Pact."

The Ambassador agreed, but remarked

24 Ibid. , p. 380.
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that he had received warning from Berlirt that a special
messenger was on-his way to London with an imoortant
declaration for Eden from Hitler.25
Time had suddenly
arrived.

run out and the moment of truth

The British government's careful formulation

of a policy was virtually nullifed because they had presumed that sufficient time remained to achieve a settlet

•

,·

ment by means of negotiation.

They found their position

of strength: abr~ptly ~nd .sl:r,ious ly, undermined, because
the best possible bargaining .counter, the Rhineland demilitarized zone,
had .vanished.
.
'
.Anthony E?en was the first member of the British
government to lc:,arn of.Hitler's coup.

He is generally

regarded by historians as an opponent of appeasement,

.

because iri· F1;bruary'l938; he resigned his office rather
than carry out the appeasement policy of the Chamberlain government.

Yet he was unable in March 1936 to do

other than compromise with a man who he feared really
did not want to compromise at all. 26

25
26

Ibid.
Goldman, "Crisis in the Rhineland," p. 169
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After listening to the German Ambassador read Hitler's memorandum on the morning of the seventh, Eden advised him that "The effect of this unilateral repudiation
of a treaty upon His Majesty's government must inevitably
be deplorable." 27

He did, however, add that he considered

Hitler's new attitude toward the League to be imoortant. 28
When the German Ambassador left, Eden immediately
summoned the French Jµnbassad?r ..

Seeking to placate the

French and restrain them from taking any dangerous steps
that might. lead to war, he informed him that the British·
cabinet would want ·to consid~r the memorandum on Monday
morning and then the situation could be discussed fully
and frankly by the two governments.

This indicated that

the Foreign Secretary expected at least a forty eight
hour delay in French military action, the period during
which any decisive counter attack should have been made.29
It is important to note that at no time during this critical period did the French government request any British

27
Eden, Facing, p. 381.
28

Ibid., p. 382.

29
Ibid. p. 383.

132
military assistance or indicate in any way that they were
30
considering a hostile response.
Eden and Flandin were in
constant telephone contact throughout 7 and 8 March.

In

addition, the Foreign Secretary met with the Prime Minister and the two menagreed that Hitler could not be believed, but that there was no public support in Great Britain for a military move.

They concluded that there was

nothing to do but call a cabinet meeting for Monday morning, and wait to see what France did.31
It has been suggested that the British king, Edward
VIII, who had maintained a close friendship with the Ger.'

man Ambassador, intervened in the Rhineland crisis and
told his Prime Minister· that he would abdicate if he made
war.

Whether he actually did intervene has never been

satisfactorily determined.

The Germans were nevertheless

convinced that he was on their side during the Rhineland
dispute. 32
On Monday, 9 March, the Br-itish

cabinet met and

agreed that Great Britain should restrict her reaction
to support for a formal condemnation by the League and
3 oF

. . D.ip 1 omacy, pp. 192, 193.
urnia,

31 Eden, Facing, pp. 385,
386.
32
Goldman, "Crisis in the Rhineland," pp. 176, 177,
citing Fritz Hesse, Hitler and the English (Wingate,.1954),
pp. 21, 22.

133
assurances for France and Belgium that Britain would fulfill her Locarno obligations. 33

That same day, Anthony

Eden addressed the House of Commons and stated the British
official position regarding the German coup,

He said

there was no reason to believe that the German action
implied a threat of hostilities.

He did say, however,

that in the event of an actual attack on France or Belgium, the British would regard themselves as in honor
bound t.o come to the aid of the country attacked.
Also on the 9th, an article appeared in The Times
(London) which perhaps best describes the reaction of the
British nation to the German reoccupation of the demilitarized zone.

Entitled "A Chance to Rebuild," it stated:

The Locarno agreement was in some ways ahead of its
time.
So much that it was never in fact allowed to
create the conditions requisite to that frahk understanding between France and Germany which was and is
the first essential of European stability.
British opinion will be nearly unanimous in its desire to turn an untoward proceeding to account and,
far from weakening the regime of treaties, to seize
the opportunity of broadening ancl strengthenin)l the
collective system which opens with the German offer
of reentry.
. The old structure of European
peace, one sided and unbalanced, is nearly in ruins.
It is the moment, not to despair, but to rebuild.
Hitler's Saturday surprise had caught both the French
and British governments off guard.

The week-end passed

without significant response to Hitler's aggression, and

33Eden, Facing, pp. 387

1

388,
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by mid-week it was apparent to Germany and the rest of
the world that neither the French nor the British would
attempt to e_iect the Germans from the R.hineland.

The

cumbersome process of League deliberations was called into
play, and Hitler merely had to sit back and await the outcome, already convinced that victory was his.

CHAPTER VIII
STALEMATE
The rearmament of the Rhineland brought with it a
change in international diplomatic leadership.

Paris

had for generations
been the seat of diplomatic
initia.
.
tive and achievement, but due to French inaction rl.uring
the Rhineland crisis, that leadershio fell bv default
to Great Britain.

It is significant that the center

for maintaining the peace of F.urone shifted to London
both symbolically and physically. The traditional home
of the League of Nations was Geneva, yet when the League
Council met to consider the Rhineland .gue.stion, deliberations were held in Lotidon at St. James Palace.

By lh

March, the day on which the League Council held its
first session, it was apparent that Great Britain had
assumed the initiative and had undertaken the role of
mediator.
Because of this shift in diplomatic responsibility,
the failure of the western democracies to oust the Germans from the Rhineland is generallv attributed to Great
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Britain.

Hriting in October of 1936, Reinhold Nie-

buhr stated that the British consistently employed a
type of diplomacy best termed "muddling through."

He

asserted that the resolution of the Rhineland crisis
hinged on Britain's response and because the British
had adopted a "wait and see" attitude, the rest of
Europe had to do likewise.

Niebuhr arguetlthat Germany's

immediate goal was to wrest the hegemony of the continent from France without directly challenging either
France or Soviet Russia.

The Nazi purnose as he saw

it was to exPand ~t the expens:e ·of the smaller nations
of Europe while avoiding conflict with the larger ones.
The importance of Bri:tt'sh diplomacy in relation to this
ambition arose from the fact'that the cornerstone of
Nazi international Politics was to do nothing which
would arouse the British and to seek by every nossible
means to detach England from her.alliance with France.

-

The Anglo-German Naval Agreement was Hitler's notice
to the world that the one error of the German imperialists in 1914 - which he intended to avoid - was to
challenge the British Navy.

Niebuhr charges Hitler

with taking advantage of Great Britain's sense of
fair play.

His article concludes on a prescient note:
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Even if war is avoided for five or ten vears at
the price of an unchallenged exnansion of Germany,
Britain will ultimately have to face a triumphant
Germany for a final _ioining of the issue. The
assumption of the British pro-German party that
justice to Germany, allowing her a moderate expansion, will ,avert war fails to take the dynamics of politics into account, Particularly the
dynamics of a fascist dictatorship. Germany is
bound to regard every successful test of strength,
not as an appeasement of her just grievances, but
as a preliminary victory which encourages to a more
ultimate conflict. Brita:i,n thus threatens to repeat the mistake of 1914 in encouraging Germany by
her indecision to hope for an ultimate British
neutrality. .
The peace of today has been
bought at the price of ihe certainty of war tomorrow.l
·
British nublic opinion,. in additfon to being dangerously pacific, also held that Hitler's move in the
Rhineland was: just a "walk in hi-s o,m back garden. "2
In addition, the British king was a friend to several
German diplomats and wa.s known to have pro-German senti~
ments.

Add to this the fact that many British govern-

ment officials nublicly eschewed military action against
Germany and there can be little doubt that the shift in
diplomatic initiative came as good news to the Chancellor
of the Third Reich.

1

Reinhold Niebuhr, "Which Way Great Britain?"
rent History XLV (November, 1936)·, 2.
2

Eden, Facing, p. 389.

Cur-
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In spite of the fact that the British Foreign Office
had taken the lead in attempting a settlement of the Rhineland crisis, the League of Nations met at the request of
the French government.

Pierre Flandin represented

his

country at the meetings, and took the floor as the first
speaker at the ouening session.

He emuhasized that the

Treaty of Locarno compelled him to bring the question
before the League Council.

He denailed the German breach

of international law and then, alrnost self-righteously,
stated that the French government, by bringing the issue
before the League had not so much exercised a right as
performed a duty.

"If it were only a question of rights,"

he said, the Locarno pact entitled France "to take strong
and decisive measures forthwith."

But because his gov-

ernment sought above all else to maintain the peace,
France voluntarily refrairied from taking military action. 3
If Flandin had really expected the League of Nations
to take action against Germany he could have specified,
when submitting the dispute to the League Council, that
Germany's action constituted a

flagrant breach of the

Treaty of Versailles and the Pact of Locarno.

He did

3 Goldman, "Crisis in the Rhineland," DP. 264, 265,
citing League of Nations Journal, 1936, Minutes of the
ninety-first (extraordinary) session of the Council,
London, March 14, 1936, p. 313.
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not.

Neither did he demand the immediate military

assistance from the Locarno guarantors to which his
government was entitled.

Instead, he stated that he

would accept whatever action the League of Nations
recommended.

This decision implied that France re-

garded the violation as non-flagrant, and restricted
4
.
Franee f rom .tak'ing uni·1 atera 1 action.

Paul van Zeeland, representing Belgium, spoke at
the second session which convened on 17 Ma.rch.

In his

speech he elo~uently described the plight of the smaller
nations of Europe whose security depended upon respect
for justice and international law.

He stressed the need

for an international structure based on law and respect
for accepted obligations, and urged the formulation of
new agreements to replace Locarno. 5
The third speaker was Maxim Litvinov, the representative of the Soviet Union.

He spoke frankly, stating that

Germany's verbal attacks.on his country made "circumlocution and diplomatic niceties" unnecessary.

The official

4
Wolfers, Britain and France, un. 49,50.
5

Goldman, "Crisis in the Rhineland,", o. 268, citing
League Journal, p. 237.
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Soviet position called for full support for France, and
indicated a willingness to accept Germany into the Lea)2;ue
of Nations.

Litvinov, however, denounced Hitler's aggres-

sion, defended the Franco-Soviet

Pact, and announced that

Germany planned to isolate the small nations of Eastern
Europe, then attack them, one bv one.

The new bilateral.

agreements Hitler proposed, Litvinov charged, would make
this possible.

He also stated that Russia was willing to

welcome Germany back into the League only when she recognized the principles on which the League was founded.

In

a pointed referer:ice to Germany's behavior, he enumerated
these principles; the observance of treaties, respect for
territorial integrity, renunciation of the settlement
of disputes by the sword, and equality of all members
of the League.

His statements implied that the Physical

removal of German troops from the ·Rhineland would be a
condition of Germany's acceotance into the Leag;ue.

6

Anthony Eden's address on the following day was considerably more conciliatorv than that of the Soviet representative.

He stated:

The breach, however plain, does not carry with
it any imminent threat of hostilities, and has
not involved that immediate action for which, in

6

324.

Ibid., pp. 269-271, citing League Journal., po. 319-

lL,l

certain circumstances, the Treaty of Locarno orovides. We happily have time in which to endow our
action with prudence, as well as the determination,
which the situation requires. The situation, however grave, carries with it an opnortunity.7
The British Foreign Secretary denounced the breach of
treaty, but insisted that there was no chance of war.

By

publicly eliminating the possibility of hostile action,
Eden significantly reduced the ability of the League ,of
Nations to secure a settlement, and indicated to Hitler
and the rest of the world that the Rhineland was not worth
fighting for.
Following Eden, representatives of other Eurooean
nations made their views known.

The Italian representa-

tive indicated his country''s dissatisfaction with League
sanctions over the Ethiopian affair, and issued a thinly
veiled threat that unless they were lifted, the Italian
government would seek an understanding with the government of the Reich.

Josef Beck, representing Poland, used

the League meeting as a forum to try to repair relations
with Germany, and carefully refrained from offering any
support for the French position.

Nicolae Titulescu,

on the other hand, offered Rumania's full support to the
French.

He warned the League of the possible consequences

7 Ibid., p. 273, citing League Journal, o. 328.
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if it accepted and legalized what Germany had done.

If

it acquiesced in this violation against the rights of two
such powerful states as France and Belgium, he asked, what
are less powerful states to think about the effectiveness
of the League as an instrument of oeace?

He concluded

that "If the League of Nations emerges from the present
crisis as the vanquished party, it will represent in the
future a noble ideal of the past rather than a living
reality of the pre~ent. 8
At the suggestion of·Anthony Eden, League members
agreed to hear a German representative, and on 18 March,
Joachim von Ribbentrop ~ppeared before the Council.

Al-

though he was fluent in English, Ribbentrop addressed the
gathering in German, interpreted by Paul Schmidt.

The

•

German diplomat explained that Germany had long borne the
burdens of limited sovereignty, but when the FrancoSoviet Treaty violated Locarno, Hitler had no alternative
but to secure German territory unilaterally.

His country

had not violated Locarno, he said, because France had
unilaterally violated it first and it had therefore ceased
to exist.

Ribbentrop further explained that Germany had

not raised the question of the compatibility of the treaty with Locarno before the League because the problem
8

Ibid., pp. 273-276, citing League Journal, DP.
329-332.
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was political as well as legal.

His country would not

have been likely to obtain satisfaction in the face of
French recalcitrance.

He added that now Germany was in

full control of all her territory, and was ready to live
in peace and friendship with her neighbors.

Germany's

willingness to cooperate in building European solidarity
lay at the heart of Hitler's foreign policy, he said.
In spite of Ribbentrop's defense of his country's actions,
the League Council formally condemned Germany's aggression,
9
and adjourned.
Following adj-ournment of,the League Council, the

'

Locarno powers met and- drew up a series of orooosals for
settling the dispute!.

On 20 March the British govern-

ment published them in the .form of a British White Paper,
announcing the terms under.which Britain, France, Italy,
(included only as a formality) and Belgiul!l were willing
to settle the crisis.

Theyproposed the following:

The German Government is invited to oresent its
argument against the Franco-Soviet mutual
assistance oact to the Permanent Court of International'Justice at The Hague.
All movement of German troops or war materials
into the Rhineland would be suspended and a
limit placed on troops already there.

9

Ibid., pp. 280, 281, citing League Journal, po.
334-337.

An international force composed of troops of the
Locarno Guarantor powers would be stationed in a
buffer zone in Ger~any along the borders of
France and Belgium until a new securitv treaty
was drawn up.
The. zone would be 12% miles wide
paralleling the frontier.
German troons would be
withdrawn fromfue zone.

'
An international
commission would be formed to
supervise the new zone.10
That same day, the Baldwin government prepared a letter which was to become the formal instrument used to revive the Entente Cordiale.

The British government pro-

mised to immediately come to the assistance of the French
government, in accordance with the Treaty of Locarno,
in regard to any measures which might be jointly decided
upon.

The letter pledged.that Great Britain would, in

return for reciorocal measures from the French government,
take all practical measures to ensure the security of the
French government, take all practical measures to ensure
the security of the French nation against unprovoked aggression.

The letter really only reaffirmed what Stanlev

Baldwin had said in 1934, that the British frontier was no
longer the chalk cliffs of Dover but the Rhine.

lO"Salvaging Locarno in London," Literary Digest

ex XI (March 28, 1936): 12.
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It did not make any provisions for aid to the Eastern
European allies of France or indicate in any way that
their security was vital to the peace of Europe.

The

letter was, in the event of the failure of the above
proposals, to be addressed to both the French and Belgian governments, at which time it would become effec-

.

t1.ve.

11
When Flandin returned to Paris on the 19th,

he was

convinced that not only had he secured foi France a valuable accord with Great Britain, but that "the British
White Paper constituted a solid. basis fqr negotiations
which would necessitate .concessions by the Germans.
The following. day, he addressed the French Chamber and
shared these convictions.

He received a hearty ovation

when he spoke of the letter of guarantee given him by
the British government.
Paper was voiced in

His faith in the British White

hi•s statement:

Negotiations on the sub.iect of the new status of
the Rhineland, and on other subjects, will not be
opened with Germany until she has expressly accepted all the preliminary conditions which form an
indivisible whole.12

11 Furnia, Diplomacy, p. 197.
12

Goldman, "Crisis in the Rhineland," p. 289.
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His speech was followed by a decision on the part of the
Chamber to raise the treasury's limits on defense spending to meet the increased needs brought about by the crisis.13
Flandin's OJ?timism was short lived.

Anthony Eden

addressed the British Parliament that same day and his
remarks indicated that the British government did not regard the White Paper as an ultimatum to Hitler.
it was presented as a ten ta ti ve. plan,

Instead

In his speech,

Eden stressed that the British government was not taking
the side of France, but was acting as a mediator in the
dispute.
Flandin made his dissa'tisfaction with Eden's remarks
known on 23 March thi:iough the French Ambassador in London.
The Foreign Secretary replied that Franc~ had misunderstood the proposals if ·she believed they were binding and
. .
l .·:
14
not mere 1y provisiona
Primarily as a result of this incident, any agreement or understanding between France and Great Britain
which had been engendered by the 19 March letter raoidly

13 Ibid.
14 New York Times, March 2Lf, 1936, n. 10.
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disintegrated and was replaced by ill-feeling and mistrust.

In an interview with the weekly newspaper Journal

des Nations, Pierre Flandin expressed his irritation over
Britain's actions:
For reasons known only to herself.
. Britain
has taken up the position of umpire in this dispute. From the first, she has not considered herself an injured party in the same position of
France but has assumed the role of mediator. Whose
fault will it be if the rising generation reflects
only the bitterness resulting from Britain's failing us at every turn? If in a case like this, where
we are defending the. rights of everyone, we are
obliged to make an isolated stand, can the FrancoBritish entepte possibly stand such a test?l5
'

Adolph Hitler was certainly a~are of the disunity
which plagued the western democracies, and realized that
concessions on his part would not likely be necessary.
was to his advantage to let time pass.

It

As the days went

by the chances that action would be taken to reverse the
coup grew increasingly remote.

Consequently, Germany

issued lengthy proposals and took her time in studying
the proposals of

the other powers.

On 1 April, Ribben-

trop present~d a memorandum to the British government.
It explained Germany's action in the Rhineland once again,
and answered the British White Paper of 20 March.

The

memorandum repeated the Reich's criticism of the FrancoSoviet Pact, and even claimed that the demilitarized zone

15
Ibid., March 26, 1936, p. 14
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had never been voluntarily accepted.

The memorandum stated

that the Rhineland clauses had been incorporated into the
Locarno treaty only after the Ruhr was forcibly occupied
and German territorial integrity violated.

It also de-

clared that the creation of the demilitarized zone had
been illegal in the first place, because Woodrow Wilson's
Fourteen Points did not intend that Germany's sovereignty
in the Rhineland be restricted.

The memorandum rejected

the proposal for bringin~- the question before the court
at The Hague, because the· court could only .iudge legal,
not political, matters. 16
A nineteen
the memorandum.

~

point German Peace Plan was contained in
It was primarily a reiteration of the Ger-

man offer of 7 March, and-included the proposals for a
twenty-five year security pact between Germany and her
eastern neighbors, a promise to rejoin the League of Nations if her proposals were accepted, and a pledge to
limit her western frontier fortifications if the French
and Belgians did the same.

But it also called for a four-

month negotiating period during which Germany would not
increase the number of troops in the Rhineland or move
them nearer the frontier.

It was also suggested that an

international commission be set up to verify this, pro-

16 Goldman, "Crisis in the Rhineland," pp. 371, 372.
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vided that the French and Belgian governments would agree
to restrict 'similar activity in their own countries.

The

plan also called for a Franco-German agreement on "moral
disarmament" and a special court of arbitration to rule
on the various aspects of such an agreement. 17
The French reaction was the same as it had been on
7 March.

The government of France could not understand

why a twenty-five year pact was necessary to replace one
of infinite duration, apd once again expressed concern
that bilateral pacts with Eastern European nations might
allow Hitler to a:bsorb those· countries one at a time
while the others were !;telpless to prevent it.

The French

government reiterated its opposition to limiting fortifications on the Franco~Gerrnan border, pointing out that
this would mean dismantling the Maginot Line. 18
The British government regarded the German memorandum
as a refusal of the conditions set forth in the British
White Paper.

Consequently, the Prime Minister transmit-

ted the March 19 letter to the French and Belgian governments and the declarations contained therein came into

17
18

Ibid.
New York Times, April 2, 1936, p. 21.
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effect.

The British intended this move to show Hitler

that they were displeased with his proposals, and to show
France and Belgium that they·would stand by them.

They

also decided to begin arrangements for military staff
talks.

The French had been pressing them to do this,
and there now seemed no reason to delay any longer. 19
British public opinion was immediately hostile to
military stqff talks, and Anthony Eden spoke to the British Parliament on -the_ suj:>ject.

He tried to make the

talks seem palatable by explaining that Britain was obligated to France and Belgium and had a proud history
of not going back on her commitments.

For those who were

concerned about British involvement in'the wars of their
neighbors across the channel, Eden made it plain that the
staff talks would be strictly limited and clearly defined.
"They are purely technical conversations.

They can in no

measure increase our political obligations - in no mea20
Eden had been forced by the pacifism and antisure. 11
French sentiment within his country to assure critics of

19

Furnia, Diplomacy, p. 197.

20
Goldman, "Crisis in the Rhineland," p. 3 76.
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the government that the military staff conversations would
not commit Great Britain to any overt action against Germany.

In a sense this nullified the value of the talks

themselves.

By totally disallowing the possibility of

joint military action, Eden and his government eliminated
any chances of ousting the German troous from the Rhineland.
On 15 April, tripartite conversations among the British, French and Belgian Chiefs of Staff began.

In the

course of the two-4ay meetings'thev discussed naval, air
and ground strateg_ies and strengths, and laid the founda,,

tion for military collaboration in the event of a German
attack. 21
In the meantime the French cabinet apuroved a reuly
to the German memorandum of 1 April along with a group of
counter-proposals labeled the French Peace Plan.

The two

statements were submitted formally to the Locarno powers
on 8 April, in Geneva and afterwards to the Lea,gue Council.
The first of the statements was a severe indictment of Germany's rearmament of the Rhineland and the proposals that
went with it.

The French refuted the German contention

i

that the Ruhr occupation had forced the Germans into Locarno, declaring that the Ruhr had been evacuated before

2 1Eden, Facing, p. 417.
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the negotiations even began.

Germany's offer to join

the League was questioned as well.

How could Germany,

after violating international agreements, fulfill the
conditions of the League Convenant which said that scrupulous respect for all treaty agreements is necessary for
22
peace?
The French plan for peace was a general call for
harmony and unity based on the League of Nations and aimed
at a united and secure' Europe.

It called ·•for an inter-

national commission controlled by the League, with armed
forces at its disposal. 23

The plan n11t forth by the French

government is virtually a reaffirmation ,of Woodrow Wilson's
Fourteen Points and clearly illustrates the degree to
which collective secur~ty and League action had permeat,ed
French diplomacy.

Totally devoid of concrete proposals,

it illustrates the wishful thinking and lack of resolve
which was characteristic of the French leadershin in 1936.
The Locarno Powers met in Geneva on 10 April, at
which time Flandin exolained the proposals and defended
the French government's s ta temen ts agi.ins t charges that
they were counter-productive and hamoered negotiations.

22 Goldman, "Crisis in the Rhineland," pn. 380, 381.
23
rbid.
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Flandin argued that the failure of the Germans to accent
the proposals of 19 March clearly indicated that neaceful
settlement was impossible, and that it was time to carry
out sanctions against Germany.

Eden disagreed, maintain-

ing that a negotiated settlement was still Possible, and
promised the French Foreign Minister that he would attemnt
to get Hitler to clarify the 1 April memorandum.

His plan

was to submit a detailed questionnaire to the German government which woul~ by the directness o.f the questions
educate public opinion even if Hitler ref.us_ed to reoly. 2 4
The resulting questionnaire was presented in Berlin
on 7 May, but fo"):' more than a week, Hitler refused to
accept it.

·rn the meantime,
the press
'learned of the
'
.

questions and published 'them before the German Chancellor
had officially received the document.

The questionnaire

began by stating that the;British government found it
regrettable that Germany had hot made a "more substantial
contribution" to a settlement, and declared that there
was a need to achieve the "greatest possible precision"
so that negotiations could succeed.

Therefore, the gov-

ernment of Great Britain wished to put some questions to
the German 12;overnment regarding the 1 Aoril memorandum. 25

2 4Eden, Facing, p. 419.
25 rbid.

The first question asked whether Hitler was in a
position to conclude genuine treaties.

The next asked

whether the German government drew any distinction between the Reich and the German nation.

Eden included

this question because he wanted it made clear whether or
not Hitler considered himself the ruler or protector of
German speaking peoples who lived outside the boundaries
of Germany.

If he had such claims, Eden believed the

world should be aware of them.

Other questions asked

whether Germany would_ respect Eurooe's political and
territorial status, and if the non-aggression pacts proposed by the .Germans could be-extended to include Russia,
.
26
Latvia and Estonia.
On llr May, Sir Eric,_Phipps, the _British Ambassador
to Germany, f~nally secured an interview with the Chancellor.

Phipps reported to Eden that it was a lengthy ti-

rade of little substance, and that Hitler refused to re27
ply until the new French government was installed.
The French elections of 3 May resulted in the replacement of Prime Minister Albert Sarraut and Foreign Minister
Fland.in with Leon Blum and Yvon Delbos, but even after
they had taken office, Hitler procrastinated in spite of

26
27

Ibid.
Ibid., p. 420.
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the fact that he had promised to reply when the new government took over.

On 18 June, Eden stated in Parliament

that Germany's failure to answer the questionnaire had
shown that Britain's attempts at mediation had been unsuccessful.

He declared that everyone wanted Germany's

reassurance that the existing territorial status of Europe
would be respected.

Once the Germans had agreed on this

point, a permanent settlement based on the disappearance
of the demilitarized zone could be made.
'

.

He added that

.

the government hoped Germany would reply to the questionnaire of 6 May so that Europe would know Germany's intentions and progress toward peace could be continued. 28
The Foreign Secretary knew that Germany was fortifying the Rhineland, and he "knew that once the fortifications were comnleted the French would never agree to neg29
otiate.
Whether Eden pressed this issue or not, negotiations were finished.

The fact that he chose not to

attempt to pressure the German Chancellor on this point
indicated that he had decided to accept fortification of
the zone.

The only alternative was military intervention,

a step never seriously under consideration by his govern-

28 Goldman, "Crisis in the Rhineland," pp. 390, 391.
29

Eden, Facing, p. 420.
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ment.

Had he informed the French, it is doubtful that

they would have forced the issue either. As soon as Blum
took office, his government was plagued by strikes
economic difficulties.

and

Blum concluded that the best

course of action was to accept the unfortunate circumstances and to go along with the British who sought a
peaceful settlement. 3 0
The kind of pressures which the Blum government
faced were well illustrated

by a conference of the Un-

ion of French Teachers at Lille in July.

The

800,000

member union passed a resolution which indicates the
strength of pacifism in France in 1936.

Their state-

ment said, in part:
Slavery is preferable to war.
We can recover from slavery, perhaps, but· never from war. .
There is no conceivable cause for which the French
nation should take up arms.31
On 23 July, representatives of Great Britain, France
and Belgium met in London and publicly recognized Hitler's
reoccupation of the Rhineland.

Although a few more futile

attempts to achieve a negotiated settlement
during the next few months,

would be made

the representatives of the

democracies had accepted the reality of the German presence in the Rhineland and acquiesced to the fact that the
30
31

Goldman, pp. 393, 394.
Ibid., p. ·405.
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troops were there to stay.

At the London meeting a

communique was issued which spoke of the "situation created by the German initiative of the 7th March," the same
subject which had been

called in previous months "the

brutal repudiation of international agreements."

This

change in phraseology reflected the position of the Blum
government.

There was little the new Premier could do

to reverse the blunders of his predecessors.

He be-

lieved history woul'd hlame them,·not him: ·ne had no
other alternative, short of a majcir military offensive
against a refortified Rhineland, and his countrymen would
not support such a move.

As Germany rearmed the Rhine-

land, with e~ch gun they installed, and each structure
that was erected, the French alliance system grew more an<l
more meaningless, and France's international prestige diminished accordingly.

Once France accented the remilitar-

ization of the Rhineland, she became increasingly dependent upon British foreign oolicy and military support.
Eventually this capitulation would bring her full circle,
from the cornerstone of a firm alliance system with the
Eastern European nations to her role as one of the four
nations which presided over the destruction of Czechoslovakia at Munich in 1938.

Ironically, the finale of the
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Rhineland crisis did not even receive the dignity of a
conference, a vote, or even a memorandum.

It simoly be-

came a part of the European diplomacy of appeasement, the
first step on the road that would lead to Munich in 1938
and to war in 1939.

CONCLUSION
The remilitarization of the Rhineland wrought several distinct
uation.

changes in the European international sit-

Strategically, France was blocked from rendering

aid to Poland and the nations of the Little Entente.

As

long as the Rhineland remained demilitarized, France
could, in the event_ of a. German attack on her Eastern
European Allies, invade'Germany through the Rhineland and
inflict a serious,··{f·not .fatal, .blow,

This capacity

was not only a very strong deterrent against such an
attack, it also carried the prospect of prompt and effective aid if such an attack did occur.

An important conse-

quence of remilitarization was that the French lost that
capacity.

Once German. tro.ops occupied th·e zone and fort-

ified the border, France could accomplish nothing without
breaking through the fortificati_ons.

Such a delay could

result in an Ally begin overrun before France could do
them any good.
Strategically, the alliances had been rendered unworkable, but the impact upon the morale of the Eastern
European nations was perhaps even more devastating.

This

is all the more tragic given the fact that when Hitler
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struck, these nations indicated their willingness to march
in the defense of France.

France never requested the aid

of her Eastern European Allies, and therefore her failure
to take action cannot be blamed on them.

The Rhineland

crisis clearly pointed up the fact that to be effective,
alliances must be backed by the will to act.

Following

that episode the nations of Eastern Europe became convinced
that the man11er in which France dealt with threats to her
own security gave little assurance of ,supl)ort should their
security be threatened.

They felt abandoned, and began

to turn away from France, seeking friends wherever
could find them.

they

Recognizing that Germany's growing might

would soon make her the dominant oower in Central Europe,
the Eastern European nations attempted·to come to terms
with the Third Reich.

During the next few years Austria

and Czechoslovakia were incorporated into the German sphere,
while Hungary ·and Rumania became more closely associated
with Germany, both economically and politically.

Faced

with the steady deterioration of her former grand alliance system, France began to disassociate herself from
the problems of Eastern Europe and to look steadily toward Great Britain for leadership in diplomatic .affairs.
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After France accepted the remilitarization of the
Rhineland, she became more and more dependent upon British foreign policy and military support.

This revival

of Anglo-French s?lidarity was more a confirmation of
mutual weakness than an alignment of strong resolve, and
it resulted in two casual ties ..·

Belgium, uncertain of any

continuing benefits from a French alliance, once again assumed the cloak

of neutrality, a move that would not long

protect her from the winds of German aggression.

The So-

viet Union, already contemptuous of the western democracies, became increasingly dissatisfied with the AngloFten:ch policy of appeasement and entered into a non-aggression
pact with Germany in 1939.
The Rhineland crisis also had a rather critical domestic result for Adolph Hitler.

Although the military

plans for the Rhineland action called for a fighting withdrawal if there was an armed counteraction from me west,
•

Hitler had opposed the inclusion of such a ulan.

~fuen his

generals insisted, he seemed to give in on the point.

The

success of the coup, which had been carried out in spite
of the misgivings of the German military hierarchy, changed
the relationship between Hitler and his military advisors.
He became convinced of his own ability to master any sit-
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uation and contemptuous of the caution shown by the Generals.

As the Fuhrer said, "With dictators, nothing suc-

ceeds like success." 1

Adolph Hitler, who had acted against

the counsel of his closest military advisors became confident that he could assume even greater risks, disregard
cautious advice, and triumph by bluff until

he could

conquer by force.
The risk Hitler took might have ended his career had
his bluff been called.

In his book The Gathering Storm,

Winston Churchill states that "If the French government
had mobilized, there. is no doubt that Hitler would have been
compelled by his own General Staff to withdraw, and a
check would have been given to his pretensions which might
well have proved fatal to his rule. "

This supposition

cannot be proven, but it is logical to surmise that had
the French reacted forcefully and succeeded in driving
the Germans from the Rhineland, even if Hitler had remained in power, he would likely have been more cautious
in the future.

Perhaps then Germany's desire for equality

in international affairs could have been dealt with at
the negotiating table instead of on the battlefield.

In-

stead, the failure of Britain and France to stop Hitler's
1
,meeler-Rennett, The Nemesis of Power, o. 353.
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treaty violations when they had the power to do so convinced him that they were not likely to stop him from carrying out his plans in the future.
The remilitarization of the Rhineland was not an isolated incident, or a chance encounter.

It was part of a

preconceived plan on the part of Adolph Hitler to secure
"living space."
ing.

He prepared for it by carefully rearm-

After the Anglo-German Naval Agreement of 1935, he

had the tacit approval of Great·Britain to rearm, even
though it was prohibited by treaty.

He announced a return

to conscription, and left the League of Nations without incident.

These successes led him to tear up the Versailles

and Locarno agreements by reoc~upying the Rhineland at a
time when Great Britain and France were at odds over
Italian aggression.
The French government maintained that the Rhineland
was essential to its security.
expel the troops from the zone?

Why then did France not
The fearful risk of war,

the strong possibility that Great Britain would not assist
them, the reluctance of the military chiefs and a strongly
pacifist public opinion all contributed heavily to the
French decision to appeal to the League of Nations.
the French turned away from the possibility of direct

Once
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action and to the machinery of the League of Nations, they
greatly reduced the possibility of removing the German hold
on the Rhineland.
Great Britain must share responsibility for the decision to resort to League action.

Throughout the crisis,

British officials urged their French counterparts to exercise caution and to keep their heads.

The British govern-

ment responded to public opinion and skirted its role as a
guarantor of the Locarno treaty.

She attempted to fulfill

'

her Locarno obligation by guaranteeing French and Belgian
borders and then sliding into the role of mediator in the
dispute, but she had agreed to guarantee not just the borders of Belgium and France, but the demilitarized zone of
the Rhineland as well.

Clearly, the British cannot remain

blameless, but their role was as a guarantor; initiative
on 7 March indeed rested with the French.

Could the Bri-

tish government, whose people did not support military
action, be expected to give it to France, when the French
themselves appeared palsied by pacifism and blind faith
in their Maginot Line?
In defending their actions during the crisis, the
British maintained that they were not adequately prepared
militarily to undertake an offensive, and that time was
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needed to beef up Great Britain's armed capabilities.

This

tactic of playing for time failed to take into account the
fact that while they rearmed, the Germans did likewise,
and that regaining sovereignty in the Rhineland gave them
the industrial wherewithal to do so.
By failing to oust the Germans from the Rhineland,
France and Great Britain sowed the seeds of war.

By

attempting to negotiate with Adolph Hitler they set the
precedent of appeasement that was to result in the Munich
conference of 1938.
The term "Munich" has become synonomous with capitulation and appeasement, ·for it was there that Great Britain
and France presided over the destruction of Czechoslovakia.,
an event many historians regard as a turning point in the
history of the inter-war years.

Yet it was in the Rhine-

land two years earlier that the precedent was set for this
capitulation.

It can therefore be concluded that the Rhine-

land crisis was much more than
. ·a. harbinger of Munich, it
was in large measure a determinant.
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APPENDIX A
The Rhineland
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APPENDIX B
Treaty of Versailles
Part III Section III
Article 42. Germany is forbidden to maintain or
construct any for"tifications either on the left bank of
the Rhine or on the right bank to the west of a line
drawn 50 kilometers to the east of the Rhine.

Article 43. In the area defined_ above the maintenance and the assembly of armed forces, either permanently or temporarily,· and military manoeuvres of any
kind, as well as the upkeep of all permanent works of
mobilization, are in the same way forbidden.

Article L,4. In case Germany violates in any manner
whatever the provisions of Articles 4-2 and L,3, she shall
be regarded as committing a hostile act against the powers signatory of the present treaty· and as calculated to
disturb the peace of the world.

168

APPENDIX C
Treaty of Locarno
Article 1. The high contracting parties collectively
and severally guarantee
. the observance of the stipulations of articles 42 and 43 of the said treaty (Ver-·
sailles) concerning the demilitarized zone.
Article 2. Germany and Belgium, and also Germany
and France, mutually undertake that they will not attack
or invade each other or resort to war against each other.
This stipulation shall not, however, apply in the case of-The exercise of the right of legitimate defense,
that is to say, resistance to a violation of the
undertaking contained in the previous paragraph
or to a flagrant breach of articles 4·2 and 43 of
the said Treaty of Versailles, if such breach constitutes an unprovoked act of ~ggression and by reason of the assembly of armed forces in the demilitarized zone immediate action is necessary.
Article 4.
1.
If one of the high contracting parties alleges
that a violation of article 2 of the present treaty or a
breach of articles 42 or 43 of the.Tr~aty of Versailles
has been or is being committed, it shall bring the question at once before the Council of the League of Nations.
2. As soon as the Council of the League of Nations
is satisfied that such violation or breach has been committed, it will notify its findings without delay to the
powers signatory of the present treaty, who.severally
agree that in such case they will each of them come immediately to the assistance of the power against whom the
act complained of is directed.
3.
In case of a flagrant violation of the nresent
treaty or of a flagrant breach of articles 42 or 43 of
the Treaty of Versailles by one of the high contracting
parties, each of the other contracting parties hereby
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undertakes immediately to come to the help of the party
against whom such a violation or breach has been directed
as soon as the said power has been able to satisfy itself
that by reason either of the crossing of the frontier or
of the outbreak of hostilities or of the assembly of armed
forces into the demilitarized zone immediate action is
necessary.
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